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PER APS the biggest problem of tort law today is the adjustment of
losses which are the more or less accidental by-product of legitimate
activities not aimed at hurting people or property. It is one phase of
the nation's accident problem which in itself and in its bearing upon
the professional activity of lawyers is of no mean proportions.1 Before
the industrial revolution, liability was imposed in this field, without
much regard to fault, upon the person whose act directly produced the
harm. 2 The development of industry and business saw the rise of
laissez-faire as the dominant economic philosophy and fault as the
dominant principle of liability for the casualties of enterprise,3 each
being a manifestation in its sphere of the individualism of the age.
Fault is still the dominant principle though the crest of its dominance
is past. There is a growing belief that in this mechanical age the vic-
tims of accidents can, as a class, ill afford to bear their loss; that the
social consequences of uncompensated loss are dire and far exceed the
amount of the loss itself; and that more good will come from distributing
these losses among all the beneficiaries of mechanical progress than by
letting compensation turn upon an inquiry into fault.4 The ultimate
t Lafayette S. Foster Professor of Law, Yale University School of Law.
1. The word "accident" is used here in the lay sense and not in the technical legal
sense which would exclude cases where fault caused the injury.
The size of the accident problem is widely publicized. Figures from the latest (1945)
edition of AccmENT FAcTs, the annual publication of the National Safety Council, Chow
that during 1944 there were in this country 95,000 accidental deaths, 24,300 of them caused
by motor vehicles. Some 850,000 persons were injured in motor vehicle accidents, and the
direct economic loss from 1944 traffic accidents, including wage loss, medical expnze3, over-
head costs of insurance and property damage is estimated at $1,250,000,000. The com-
parable figures for the years just before the war were (for motor vehicles) even higher.
The lifting of rationing restrictions and the high average age of cars on the road po:e a.
threat for the near future which has been much played up in the press and popular maga-
zines. See, e.g., LIFE, Dec. 17, 1945, p. 43.
Some indication of the high proportion of tort cases on court dockets in pre-var years
is given by the findings of the New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, in
PROBLEMS RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTS AND GENERAL WELFARE (1933) 609-10. Similar
observations with regard to litigation in various parts of the country appaar in CoiuunD.IA
UNIVERsrY RESEARCH COuNcm, RE oRT oF THE Com,.TTEE To STUDY C0wE.wx-qATI.n
FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1932) 35-9.
2. Ames, Law & Morals (1908) 22 HARv. L. RFv. 97; Isaacs, Fault and LwUlily (1918)
31 HARv. L. REv. 954; 1 STREET, FoUNDAT O s op LEGAL LIABILITY (1905) c.6; SHuL,;
AND JAmEs, CASES AND IATERIALS ON TORTS (1942) c. 1, §2.
3. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylan& v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. or PA. L. RE% 293, 373, 423.
4. Pound, The End of Law as Dereloped in Legal Rules and Docirires (1914) 27 IAnv.
L. REv. 195, 233; NEw YORK STATE CoNsTrrrrroNAL Co.,NTIO . Comnrr, op. cit.
supra, note 7, at 602. See President & Dir. of Georgetown College ,. Hughes, 130 F. (2d)
810, 814 (App. D. C., 1942), per Rutledge, J.; cf. concurring opinion of Traynor, J. in Ezcoh
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. (2d) 453, 461, 150 P. (2d) 436, 440 (1944).
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outcome of this belief would be some form of social insurance. Work-
men's compensation statutes have carried this approach into practice
in what used to be a large area of tort law,5 but in the rest of the field
we are considering things have not gone nearly so far. The newer ideas
are making themselves felt, however, and as a result a process of limi-
tation, corrosion, and change of the fault principle is taking place.
This was the most pronounced trend in tort law during the years before
the war and it has apparently continued despite many cross-currents
and recessions. I
THE IMPOSING OR WITHHOLDING OF LIABILITY ON BASES OTHER
THAN FAULT
Even as it came to prevail, the principle of fault never quite swept
away older notions of absolute liability, though it came nearer to
doing so in this country than in England.6 Liability without fault per-
sisted, with more or less vitality in the fields of trespass to land, in
nuisance cases, and where injury was caused by the escape of danger-
ous substances artificially collected on land (the doctrine of Rylands v.
Fletcher 7). There have been, too, occasional statutes imposing absolute
liability on specific enterprises for losses due to particular kinds of
hazards they present. We shall survey some recent developments in
each of these fields and seek to evaluate them in the light of the current
trends regarding distribution of accident losses.
Trespass.
Where direct injury to real property is concerned,8 the older prin-
ciples of trespass lingered on though they had been displaced in cases
concerning damages to persons or chattels. In a few recent cases at-
tempts have been made to rest liability on a similar basis. In United
-Electric Light Company v. Deliso Construction Company,9 plaintiff had
a system of underground wires beneath the highways by permits from
the city. Defendant was constructing a sewer tunnel beneath these
wires, under contract with the city. To reinforce the top of the tunnel,
5. Consistently with constitutional principles New York Cent. R. Co. v. White,
243 U. S. 188 (1917); Mountain States Timber Co., 243 U. S. 219 (1917).
6. Bohlen, TheRuleinRylandsv. Fleltcher (1911) 59 U. PA. L. REv. 298, 373,423.
7. L. R. 3 H. L. 300 (1868).
8. Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1849) (blasting); Rochester Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Dunlop, 148 Misc. 849, 266 N. Y. Supp. 469 (Munroe County Ct., 1933) (damage by air-
plane). RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 166. As a matter of fact the Hay case, which was
brought before the Code, was in the form of trespass on the case, and the opinion did not
rest upon the physical invasion. But the case has come to stand for the proposition that
liability for blasting damage is absolute only where there is a technical trespass, Booth v.
Rome, W. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893); Smith, Liabilityfor Damage
to Land by Blasting (1920) 33 HARV. L. REV. 542, 667.
9. 315 Mass. 313, 52 N. E. (2d) 553 (1943).
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the defendant forced concrete through holes in the top. Some concrete
thus reached the plaintiff's system of wires and damaged them. Plain-
tiff sued with counts in negligence, trespass, nuisance, and under the
theory of Rylands v. Fletcher. The trial court directed a verdict for
defendant on the last three counts, and the jury found for defendant
on the first, thus ruling negligence out of the case. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts sustained exceptions to the direction
of a verdict on the trespass and nuisance counts. Plaintiff was found
to have no property interest in the land, but "defendant had no more
right to injure this underground system because it was personal prop-
erty than it would have if it had become a part of the realty." 11 There
was here, the court thought, an affirmative act producing physical
invasion of plaintiff's property, and the act was intended though the
results were not. So the trespass count was upheld. If the opinion is
to be taken at full face value, it is indeed a landmark in torts for it
reverses the whole course of American decisions for the past hundred
years, so far as injuries to person or personal property go. The court's
reasoning is exactly that which Chief Justice Shaw rejected in that
bell-wether of nineteenth century, personal injury cases, Broawn v.
Kendall." The defendant's act there (raising a stick to part fighting
dogs) was just as much "intended" as was the defendant's act here; 12
but the court in 1850 refused to impose liability for the unintended
consequences of lawful acts carefully done, a ruling which is the very
essence of the fault principle. Probably the Deliso case was not in-
tended as a radical departure from precedent. Perhaps it w, ill end up
as nothing but a minor extension of the cases involving trespass to
land, and will be confined to personal property which would be treated
as a fixture except for some peculiar circumstance of the case in ques-
tion. The court says, however, that the nature of the property has
nothing to do with the decision. And if that is so, it is hard to see any
rational basis for limiting a principle whose sweeping implications will
surely not be accepted by the court. 13
In any event, the prospects do not appear favorable to any great
10. 315 Mlass., 313, 319, 52 N. E. (2d) 553, 557 (1943).
11. 60 lass. 292 (1850).
12. The court in the earlier decision was unwilling to call the conduct "intentional"
because the harm was not intended. That reasoning would, of courze, be fully as applicable
here.
13. In Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923 (1900), the New York court
applied the trespass principle--of absolute liability for injury directly caused by voluntary
conduct-in the field of injuries to persons. It was quite consistent xith the earlier common
law but as we have seen this had been superseded by the fault principle in injuries to prrzons
and chattels. As the course of decision in New York has made clear, the retention of the
earlier basis of liability was confined to cases of ex\tra-hazardous conduct (e.g., blasting).
In the Ddiso case the court found that the activity involved was not particularly dangerous,
so the decision cannot be limited on that ground.
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development of trespass in the gefiiral field of accident compensation.
The learning and the limits of trespass were technical and tricky.14
In the light of present-day needs they are capricious and irrelevant. 16
It is neither surprising nor unfortunate, therefore, that the courts have
made no widespread attempt to use the vehicle of trespass to extend
absolute liability."8
14. Consider for instance the requirement of directness or immediacy, as illustrated by
the case of Mawson v. Vess Beverage Co., 173 S. IV. (2d) 606 (Mo. App. 1943). Here de-
fendant had put advertising signs on the front of a vacant house owned by Mawson, with-
out his permission. Plaintiff, the five-and-a-half-year old Mawson child, was injured in
trying to take down the signs. There was nothing careless or improper in the way the signs
were attached to the property, or in their condition, so the plaintiff's only hope of recovery
lay in trespass. But his voluntary intervening act, though not negligent, came between tile
wrong and the injury. So the relationship between the two was not direct enough to satisfy
the requirements for trespass. Scott v. Shepherd, 8 Wils. 403 (C. P. 1773), the famous
squib case, went as far as any in finding directness or immediacy, and there the intervening
acts were spontaneous, and-as the court viewed it-practically reflex actions. But ef.
Guille v. Swan, 19 John. 381 (N. Y. 1822). The decision in the Mawson case seems accurate
enough in terms of the concepts invoked by the plaintiff himself though the question on
which it turns would scarcely deserve a place in any rational scheme for accident compensa-
tion.
15. Witness New York's ill-starred attempt in blasting cases, to measure liability by
reference to the ancient distinctions between trespass and case. Where blasting operations
cast debris and so cause injury to property, Hay v. Cohoes Co., 2 N. Y. 159 (1849), or
person, Sullivan v. Dunham, 161 N. Y. 290, 55 N. E. 923 (1900), liability is absolute. For
damages caused by concussion from blasting, liability is imposed only if there is negligence.
Booth v. Rome W. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1893). But surely if there is
any special reason for absolute liability here it is because of the extra-hazardous character
of the operation, and not because the operation happens to cause injury in one way rather
than in another. Smith, Liabilityfor Damage to Land by Blasting (1920) 33 HARv. L. Ruv.
542, 667. Such operations often cause physical injury without any trespass. And conduct
which is not extra hazardous often causes trespass, so it makes little sense to carve out an
area for special treatment along the lines of the old distinctions. New York, however,
persists in making the distinction to this very day. Coley v. Cohen, 289 N. Y. 365, 45 N. E.
(2d) 913 (1942); Nordone v. Mondo, 269 App. Div. 896, 56 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 606 (4th Dep't
1945). And a few other recent decisions have followed it. Indian T. Ill. Oil Co. v. Rain-
water, 140S. W. (2d) 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), 19 TEx. L. REv. 89; Note (1942) 31 ICY. L.
Rav. 78 (collecting Kentucky cases). Contra: Richard v. Kaufman, 47 F. Supp. 337 (E. D.
Pa. 1912); Jones v. Oman, 184 S. W. (2d) 568 (Tenn. App. 1944).
16. Trespass is however occasionally useful in bringing about a sensible decision, espe-
cially in the face of some arbitrary limitation on liability. For instance, in Bouillon v.
Laclede Gaslight Co., 148 Mo. App. 462, 129 S. W. 401 (1910), distinguished its Mawson v,
Vess Beverage Co., 173 S. W. (2d) 606 (Mo. App. 1943), the court allowed recovery for
physical consequences of fright where it resulted from a trespass to land. (But ef. Morgan
v. Hightower's Adm'r, 291 Ky. 58, 163 S. W. (2d) 21 (1942) where the court refused to
hold liable for similar damages the estate of a man who came to plaintiff's home ostensibly
to pay a call but actually to commit suicide). In Schloendorff v. Society of the New York
Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914) the notion of trespass was invoked to defeat




Absolute liability was also imposed at common law for nuisance,
and the basis for an action on this score makes far better sense in terms
of present-day problems than is the case in trespass.17 But the idea of
nuisance finds more significant application in adjusting conflicts
between more or less permanent uses of different pieces of land than
it does in the solution of the accident problem."5 In that sphere lia-
bility for nuisance is largely confined to cases where there has been
either a substantial interference with the interest of an individual in
the use or enjoyment of land (private nuisance), or a condition which
has injured him while in the exercise of a public right (public nui-
sance). 9 Still a further limitation has sometimes been put on the con-
cept, namely, that conduct or a condition must be continuing before
it can constitute a nuisance.20 Recent cases indicate a tendency to
reject this requirement 21 or to emasculate it. Thus where a street
sweeper was being operated on a dark night against the current of
traffic, with insufficient lighting, the danger was found continuous
enough to be a nuisance. 22 But in its recent applications, the nuisance
theory as a principle of liability for accidental physical harm has not
operated so much to extend the sphere of absolute liability as to avoid
some barrier to recovery (such as governmental immunity, or con-
tributory negligence) where the nuisance is grounded on fault.2 3
17. For example, the reasonableness of defendant's use of his land under all the cir-
cumstances may be a factor in determining whether there is a nuisance at all and, if there is,
(under one rule) whether it should be enjoined. Smith, Reasonable Use of One's Own Prop.
erty as a Justification for Damage to a Neighbor (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 383; McClintock,
Discretion to Deny Injunction Against Trespass and Nuisance (1928) 12 MAn:. L. Rnv. 565.
18. In this aspect, the law of nuisance has aptly been called a "proCeLas of judicial
zoning." PROSSER, ToRTs (1941) 585.
19. Clark v. Pierce & Norton Co., 131 Conn. 499, 40 A. (2d) 752 (1945) (dangerous
condition in private amusement park cannot be nuisance); Higgins v. Connecticut Light
and Power Co., 129 Conn. 606, 30 A. (2d) 38S (1943); see PRossER, TorTS (1941) c. 13.
20. It is easy to see how this requirement of continuity fits into the "procez3 of judicial
zoning," for without it there would often be no such unreasonable interference with the
enjoyment of land as to deserve redress (e.g., smoke, smell, etc.). But the requirement has
also been applied where undoubted physical injury has been caused. Booth v. Rome,
NV. & 0. T. R. R., 140 N. Y. 267, 35 N. E. 592 (1S93). See Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v
Fletcher (1911) 59 U. OF PA. L. REv. 298, 313-4.
21. United Electric Light Co. v. Deliso Construction Co., 315 Mars. 313, 52 N. E.
(2d) 553 (1943) discussed supra, p. 366; Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault (1942) 20 Trx. L.
REv. 399,402, n. 8.
22. Warren v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A. (2d) 1 (1942). In Jones v. Hayden,
310 Mass. 90, 37 N. E. (2d) 243 (1941), where defendant's truck obstructed the sidewall: a
few minutes longer than an ordinance allowed, it was held that a pedestrian who fell while
walking around the truck in the icy street was entitled to go to the jury on the theory of
nuisance even though (as the verdict on another count established) there was no negligence.
23. In Warren v. Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A. (2d) 1 (1942), for example, the city
was held liable on nuisance grounds when, because of governmental immunity, it would
have escaped liability for negligence. See infra p. 373.
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The doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher.
In England the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher24 was probably little
more than a corollary of principles of absolute liability generally ap-
plied to damages to land.2 5 In this country where there had been
wider departure from the trespass notion, the corollary at first found
little favor.2 1 Since then, however, the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher
has had considerable development as a rational judicial attempt to
select ultra-hazardous use of land for special treatment so far as the
obligation goes to compensate some of those who may be injured if the
hazards should be realized. No important decision has marked this
development since the war but the course of decision over a somewhat
longer period indicates pretty clearly that it is unsafe to put too much
reliance on earlier dicta or decisions repudiating the doctrine. 27
Statutes.
Absolute liability has often been imposed by statute upon some
kinds of activity. The Uniform Aeronautics Act, for example, makes
operators and owners of planes liable without fault for injuries to
persons or property on land caused by the vicissitudes of aviation.',
This provision has been adopted without substantial change by eight-
een states and Hawaii, Minnesota doing so since the war.29 The same
act adopts the rule of fault for injury to one who has voluntarily ex-
posed himself to the risks of aviation.3"
24. L. R. 3 H. L. (1868).
25. Bohlen, The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1911) 59 U. oF PA. L. REV. 298, 373, 423.
26. Bohlen, supra note 25; Thayer, Liability Without Fault (1916) 29 HARV. L. REv.
801.
27. Burke, Rylands v. Fletcher in Illinois (1944) 22 CHi-KENT REV. 103. In United
Electric Light Co. v. Deliso Construction Co., 315 Mass. 313, 52 N. E. (2d) 553 (1943) tho
court found the doctrine inapplicable to the situation presented.
28. UmFORM AERONAUTICS ACT § 5, 11 U. L. A. (1938) 161. The current supplements
to 11 U. L. A. (1938) list the states which have adopted the act and show any modifications,
made in the terms of the uniform law. Twenty-two states and Hawaii have now adopted
the Uniform Aeronautics Act, but Arizona, Idaho, Maryland, and Pennsylvania have sub-
stituted the rule of negligence for that of absolute liability in the section under consideration.
Legis. (1945) 30 IowA L. REv. 232.
There is nothing novel in imposing on a new enterprise the burden of compensating
those who may become victims of one or more of its peculiar hazards. Early legislation in
England created absolute liability for the escape of canal water, 34 Gno. III, c. 26, § 15
(1794), in terms so sweeping that it could not be avoided even by showing the interposition
of an act of God. Makin, Ltd. v. London and North Eastern Ry. [1943] 1 K. B. 467. A
familiar example of the same sort of thing is found in statutes making railroads absolutely
liable for damage by fire caused by locomotive sparks. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930),
§ 3735.
29. Minnesota Laws 1943, c. 653. The same year, the Uniform Aeronautics Act was
withdrawn from the active list of Uniform Acts recommended for adoption by the states.
11 U. L. A. (Supp. 1944) 172.
30. UNIFORm AERONAUTICS ACT § 6. 11 U. L. A. (1938) 163.
Those who voluntarily come to the airport and are injured on the ground there may
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THE WITHHOLDING OF LIABILITY BECAUSE OF A POLICY OF
EXEMPTION NOT GROUNDED ON FAULT
Charitable institutions on one hand, the state and its political sub-
divisions on the other, have in the past been more or less exempted
from liability where, but for traditional reasons of -policy, they would
have had to answer for the negligence of their agents and employees.
Recent developments in this field are significant not because they work
any extension in the substantive grounds of liability, but rather because
they indicate a trend towards curtailing or even eliminating the exemp-
tions which were based on considerations other than fault.
Charitable Institutions.
In the case of charitable institutions there has been a truly outstand-
ing opinion. In President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,35
three of the six judges of the Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia who sat on the case would have swept away entirely all im-
munity on this score. The opinion, by Rutledge, J., contains an ex-
cellent account of the history and development of the rule of exemp-
tion. Like the mule, and many another rule of law, it is without pride
of ancestry or hope of posterity.32 Besides collecting the authorities
and summarizing the present state of American law, this opinion con-
tains trenchant analysis both of the reasons for the rule and of the
shortcomings of the half-way measures to get away from it which are
found in so many states.
On the eve of the war New York had repudiated the rule of exemp-
tion 33 but later decisions have made it clear that her courts wil not
hold a hospital for negligence of a nurse or doctor in carrying out his
professional functions. He is then said to be acting as an independent
contractor, not a servant of the hospital. 34
well be thought not to come within the policy behind the absolute liability impoad by § S.
Cf. Prokop v. Becker, 345 Pa. 607, 29 A. (2d) 23 (1942); Deojay v. Lyford, 139 Me. 234, 29
A. (2d) 111 (1942). Maine has not adopted the Uniform Act.
31. 130 F. (2d) 810 (App. D. C. 1942).
32. It was based on an English decision which was overruled in England before it wa,
followed in America. Recent law review treatment of the subject may be found in Note3
(1944) 29 IowA L. Rsv. 624; (1943) 10 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 211; Comment (1943) 17 TrLuru
L. REv. 621.
33. Sheehan v. North Country Community Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. (2d) 2S
(1937).
34. Lee v. Glens Falls Hospital, 265 App. Div. 607, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 169 (3d Dep't
1943), aff'd without op., 291 N. Y. 526, 50 N. E. (2d) 651 (1943). Here the hospital was held
not liable for the head nurse's decision to leave a delirious patient unattended for a few
minutes. The majority opinion in the Appellate Division suggested there may have been no
negligence but rested on the rule stated in the text. Two judges dissented on the ground
that there should be vicarious liability. Although there was no opinion in the Court of
Appeals, the statement of facts stressed the suggestion that there had been no negligence.
Cf. Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. (2d) 373 (1940) v;hich
1946]
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A number of recent cases also deal with the situation presented
where the charitable institution is insured against liability. Since one
of the main functions of the exemption was that of preventing the
diversion of trust funds away from the donor's purposes, some courts
have concluded that it shields only the trust funds and does not bar
the entry of judgment against the charitable institutions at least if
the judgment can be satisfied in any other way, as will be the case if
there is liability insurance. 5 This ground of liability, however, has
not been extended since the war, and several decisions have held that a
charitable institution's exemption is not affected by the fact that it is
insured. The most careful of these is one by the Illinois Appellate
Court." In an earlier case that court had said that the fact of insur-
ance could not be considered, because it would prejudice the jury."
But the court now rejects that reasoning as untenable since here the
fact of insurance is claimed to affect substantive liability. Liability is
not imposed, however, because it would be reflected in increased
premiums which would have to be met out of the trust funds. 3 If the
policy to protect trust funds from bearing the share of the social cost
of accident caused by the administration of the trust were a valid
policy, the court's conclusion would follow. As it is, the existence of
insurance only serves to point up the fact that instead of spelling ruinous
loss to individual defendants, liability may mean only the payment of
a reasonable and calculable sum.39
implies that defendant would not be liable for errors in medical treatment by doctors and,
nurses. But there seems to be a disposition to construe the limitation narrowly, and the
hospital will be held for errors of nurses or doctors unless they occur in matters calling for
the exercise of professional judgment. Ranelli v. Society of N. Y. Hosp. 49 N. Y. S. (2d)
898 (Tr. T. Q. Co., 1944), aff'd on reduction of verdict, 269 App. Div. 906, 56 N. Y. S. (2d)
481 (2d Dep't 1945) (nurse had decided to put sideboards on patient's bed, then forgotten
to get them; hospital held).
Apparently the rule in England and Canada is very much like that in New York.
MacLeod, Hospital's Liability for Acts of Nurses (1940) 18 CAN. B. REv. 776.
35. Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. (2d) 284 (1938);
O'Connor v. Boulder Colo. Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. (2d) 835 (1939); cf.
Fordyce & McKee v. Women's Chris. Nat. Libr. Ass'n, 79 Ark. 550, 96 S. W. 155 (1906).
In Louisiana the immunity of'a charitable institution is purely personal, and unavailable
to the insurance carrier who may be sued directly. Messina v. Soci6t6 Frangaise, 170 So.
801 (La. App. 1936); Lusk v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 199 So. 666 (La. App. 1941).
36. Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. (2d) 139 (1945).
37. Myers v. Y.M.C.A. of Quincy, 316 Ill. App. 177, 44 N. E. (2d) 755 (1942). See
adverse comments in Note (1943) 10 U. OF CH. L. REv. 211; Note (1943) 21 CU-IrrgN
REv. 256.
38. Accord: Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. (2d) 212 (1942); Stedem v. Jewish
Mem. Hosp. Ass'n, 187 S. W. (2d) 469 (Mo. App. 1945).
39. See comments of Rutledge, J., in President & Director of Georgetown Hospital v.
Hughes, 130 F. (2d) 810, at 820 (App. D. C. 1942).
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Tle State and Its Political Subdivisions.
The other great field of immunity from tort is that which shields the
sovereign and its political agencies." The New York legislature had
before the war broadly waived the immunity of the State and assumed
liability to the same extent as an individual. 41 In Holnes v. County of
Erie,42 it has been held that this legislation also deprived a county of
immunity in tort, since the only source of the county's immunity is the
immunity of the State, whose governmental functions are simply dele-
gated to its civil divisions. The grounds of this decision are broad
enough to sweep away the immunity of any political subdivision of
the State, including municipalities, a matter which the course of legis-
lation and other decisions had left in some doubt.4 3
As in the case of charitable institutions, the question has arisen
whether the existence of liability insurance lifts the immunity attach-
ing to the performance of a governmental function. But here the prob-
lem is more complex. In the absence of statute it has generally been
ruled that a governmental unit is without authority to use public funds
to buy insurance to cover a non-existent liability.4" And the unau-
thorized purchase of insurance does not bring liability into being.41
There are, however, many statutes providing that insurance may be
procured to cover specified activities-often the operation of school
40. The classic treatment of the subject is Borchard, Goertnint Liability in Tort
(1924) 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129, 229, (1926) 36 id. 1, 757, 1039, (1928) 28 C L. L. REv. 577, 734.
See also Blachly and Oatman, Approaches to Governmental Liability in Tort: A Compzjratrr
Survey (1942) 9 LAw & CoNTE"P. PROB. 131.
41. N. Y. CoURT OF CLArflS AcT § S.
42. 291 N. Y. 798, 53 N. E. (2d) 369 (1944). Lower court opinions appear in 173 Mivc.
46, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 960 (Sup. Ct, 1942), and 266 App. Div. 220, 42 N. Y. S. (2d) 243 (4th
Dep't 1943).
43. Since the act originally waiving immunity for the state, the legislature had parzed
several acts imposing liability upon political subdivisions of the state in cpL-ific situations.
An example was N. Y. GENERA.L MUNICIPA.L L.W § 50-a, making municipalities liable for
negligence on the operation of their motor vehicles. From this course of legislation it could
certainly have been inferred that the legislature did not believe it had swept away immunity
in all situations, and lower courts had sometimes proceeded on this assumption. Bernardine
v. City of New York, 182 Misc. 609, 44 N. Y. S. (2d) 881 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
As to what is a governmental, what a proprietary function, decisions continue to follov:
the lines of development charted before the war. See, for example, cases collected in Noteo,
(1945) 156 A. L. R. 692 (cleaning and sprinkling of streets); (1945) 156 A. L. R. 714 (collec-
lection and disposal of garbage); (1942) 138 A. L. R. 126 (airports); Note (1943) 28 Cort.
L. Q. 372 (parks).
44. See collection of opinions of state Attorneys General in Borchard, Recent Stattory
Developments in Municipal Tort Liability (1936) 2 LEGAL NOTES ox Loc,%, Gov!asrM;r
89, 94.
45. Lambert v. City of New Haven, 129 Conn. 647, 30 A. (2d) 923 (1943); Wallace v.
Laurel County Board of Education, 287 Ky. 454, 153 S. MV (2d) 915 (1941); Keoman v.
Fallowfield Tovmship School District, 345 Pa. 457, 29 A. (2d) 17 (1942).
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buses. 4 And under such a statute the benefits of the insurance may
be reached by appropriate action.47
II
MODIFICATIONS OF LIABILITY BASED ON FAULT
Except for workmen's compensation and an occasional other forward
looking statute, the main assault on the citadel of fault has not been a
frontal attack but rather a boring from within. The major trends have
been concerned with the enlargement of duties; the liberalization of
standards of proof; the increasing concern of society to provide a
financially responsible defendant and the erosion of contributory negli-
gence, imputation of negligence to the plaintiff, and other doctrines
which impede recovery. We shall next examine recent developments
in connection with each of the elements of a negligence case, not only
to see any manifestations of these trends but also to see what forces
are at work and where there have been areas of relative stability.
THE NEGLIGENCE ISSUE
Duty.
(a) The Standards of care. An account of developments in this field
calls for appreciation of some relevant practical facts. Plaintiffs win
between two thirds and three quarters of the negligence cases tried
to the jury.4 Any rule, therefore, which will help to get the case to the
jury on any issue will by and large help plaintiffs, while any rule that
will bring about directed verdicts will help defendants. The standard
of conduct in negligence cases is generally so formulated as to call
upon the exercise of the jury's function. The parties must act as rea-
sonably prudent persons would under the circumstances, and it is for
the jury to tell whether they have or not. But occasionally, specific
standards of conduct have been worked out in detail by the law.
It was Holmes' view that progress should be made in that direction
and that courts should declare whenever possible whether a given form
46. For a collection of such statutes, see Borchard, Recent Statutory Developments in
Municipal Liability in Tort (1936) 2 LEGAL NoTEs on Loc. Gov. 89, 95-97,
47. Earl W. Baker & Co. v. Lagaly, 144 F. (2d) 344 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944), (under
Oklahoma statute; suit directly against the insurer); Taylor v. Knox County Bd. of Ed.,
292 Ky. 767, 167 S. W. (2d) 700 (1942) (action may be pursued to judgment against board
of education so as to fix measure of insurer's liability, but judgment may not be satisfied
out of public funds).
48. Judicial Statistics of the Work of the Supreme Court of New York, 1st. Judicial
Department (1930-1935); CLARK AND SHULMAN, LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT
(1937), 74, 213; Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation (1936)
3 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 476, note 1. The proportion becomes even more significant when
it is realized that defendants try especially hard to settle cases where liability is clear.
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of conduct is negligent or not as a matter of law.0 A variation on this
theme was the view that those engaged in a trade or industry should
be held to no higher standard of conduct than that which was formu-
lated in the practices and customs of that industry. 9
From whatever source they are derived, specific standards of conduct
tend to restrict liability. Sometimes they have been applied as maxi-
mum standards, so that one who has taken certain defined precautions
cannot be found negligent, But even when they operate as minimum
standards, so that a party who has not met them is negligent as a
matter of law, they generally work in favor of defendants, by taking
the issue of contributory negligence away from the jury. As Nixon says,
"for plaintiff's counsel, already enjoying the favor of the jury, the
need to obtain a directed verdict based upon a proved deviation
from a specific standard is less important than for a defendant's
counsel who will strive to wrest the case from the jury by seeking a
directed verdict based on the plaintiff's failure to observe such a
standard." 1
The trend has been definitely away from fixed standards derived
either from judicial notions of what is proper or from trade practice.
Examples of recession in recent decades from judge-made standards
were the overruling of Baltihore & Ohio Railroad v. Goodnzanz, 2 and
the movement away from the rigid range-of-vision rule for motor-
49. HOLiES, THE ComoN Lsw (ISSI) 111; Lorenzov. Witrth, 170 Mass . 596,49 N. E.
1010 (1898). The high watermark of this notion was probably reached in Baltimore & 0. R.
Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66 (1927).
Of course courts always set the outer limits of what a jury may reasonably characterize
as reasonable conduct. But Holmes' view would call upon the courts to play a much more
active part in formulating standards than that.
50. Lehigh & Vilkesbarre Coal Co. v. Hayes, 128 Pa. 294, 18 Ad. 387 (1889); Kilbride
v. Carbon Dioxide & M. Co., 201 Pa. 552, 51 Atl. 347 (1902); cf. Baltimore & 0. R. R. v.
Groeger, 266 U. S. 521 (1925). Holmes apparently did not approve of the rule in the Hayes
and Ki/bride cases, and this is indicated by Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Behymer, 189 U. S. 463,
470 (1903).
51. Nixon, supra note 48, at 476.
52. 275 U. S. 66 (1927). At least the ex\treme statements in the opinion in that case
which had made it famous, were overruled in Pokora v. Wabash R. R., 292 U. S. 98 (1934).
The treatment which had been received by the Goodiman case from other courts bafore its
demise is told in Note (1930) 43 HA.v. L. Rnv. 926. Of course where plaintiff drives on to a
grade crossing to collide with a train which he could readily have seen, had he looked while
driving towards the crossing, most courts will hold him negligent as matter of law. And
the facts in any given case may demonstrate that a party could not have beea careful, quite
apart from the application of fixed rules of conduct in situations where men might differ as
to the wiser course. An example is McLeod v. Kjos, 150 Wash. 637, 274 P. 180 (1929),
where a pedestrian ran into the left rear fender of a slowly moving auto. But the"situations
are relatively rare outside of the stereotyped grade-crossing case. Leclair v. Boudreau,
101 Vt. 270, 143 AtL 401 (1923); see Boscarello v. N. Y., N. H. & H. Ry., 112 Conn. 279,
284, 152 Atl. 61, 62 (1930).
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ists."3 There have been no striking developments here since the war.
Apart from a retrogressive decision in Louisiana on the range-of-vision
rule,"4 no reversal is indicated of the prevailing trend to formulate the
standard in general terms so that the jury will apply it."
So far as custom and trade practices go, the victory of the jury has
been well-nigh complete. The Penpsylvania court which, in another
generation had virtually permitted industry to set its own standards
of care 6 now declares in ringing tones: '!Other manufacturers .. .
are not authorized to prescribe the standards of care by which the
respective rights and liabilities of persons subject to the jurisdiction
of Pennsylvania courts are determined." 61 Other recent decisions are
to the same effect. 58 One Missouri decision,59 to be sure, was at least
equivocal but later Missouri decisions do not apply the older rule and
suggest that custom is a surer guide to what is care in master and
servant cases than in others. 0 In one field alone, the restrictive view
53. Moss v. Christensen-Gardner, Inc. 98 Utah 253, 98 P. (2d) 363 (1940). Morehouse
v. City of Everett, 141 Wash. 399, 252 Pac. 157, (1926). See (1938) 22 MINN. L. REV. 877;
(1938) 13 NOTRE DAmE LAWYER 324; (1935) 23 CALiF. L. REV. 498; Nixon, supra note 48;
Notes (1926) A. L. R. 1403; (1929) 58 A. L. R. 1493; (1933) 87 A. L. R. 900; (1935) A. L. R.
546. Hart v. Stence, 219 Iowa 55, 257 N. W. 434, (1934).
54. Hogue v. Akin Truck Line, 16 So. (2d) 366 (La. App. 1944). In an able note(1944)
18 TuLANE L. REV. 648, it is shown that by a series of statutes the legislature had clearly
evinced the intention to put primary responsibility for collisions of this kind on the vehicle
parked unlawfully without lights. The decision, however, probably marks no departure
from former Louisiana case law.
55. What is said in the text is not meant to apply to the statutory standard cases,
treated infra, p. 366 eL seq.
56. See note 50, supra. In Schell v. Miller N. B. Storage Co., 157 Pa. Super. 101, 42 A.
(2d) 180 (1945), this rule is again relied on, but in view of the Pennsylvania cases cited in
notes 57 and 58, infra, this decision can scarcely be regarded as authoritative.
57. Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A. (2d) 850 (1945). The court held that
neither the custom of other manufacturers nor the approval of the Surgeon General of
United States would prevent a jury from finding inadequate the warning of danger on the
label of a cleaning fluid which it might be deadly to inhale.
58. Conformity to custom was held not to preclude a finding of negligence in Polk v.
Los Angeles, 159 P. (2d) 931 (Cal. 1945) (custom to insulate high tension wires only so as
to prevent loss of current); Cassanova v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 204 La. 813,
16 So. (2d) 444 (1943), (1944) 18 TULANE L. REV. 646 (1945), 6LA. L. REV. 204, 210 (custom
as to arrangement of steps, etc., in theatre); Hudson v. Grace, 348 Pa. 175, 34 A. (2d) 498
(1943) (custom of manufacturers to have steam vents at certain heights); cf. Calley v,
Boston & Maine Ry., 93 N. H. 359, 42 A. (2d) 329 (1945) (standards of American Associa-
tion of State Highway Officers, and of federal government, as to guardrails on bridge). In
Polk v. Los Angeles, supra, the court held that deviation from a custom of tree trimmers to
wear rubber gloves when working near electric wires, was not necessarily negligent.
59. McClaren v. G. S. Robins & Co., 349 Mo. 653, 162 S. W. (2d) 856 (1942). This
case involved facts somewhat like those in Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A.
(2d) 850 (1945), cited supra note 57, in which the Pennsylvania court expressed its disagree-
ment with this decision of the Missouri court. Cf. also Wommack v. Orr, 352 Mo. 113,
176 S. W. (2d) 477 (1943) (under Federal Employers' Liability Act).
60. Cameron v. Small, 182 S. W. (2d) 565 (Mo. 1944); Zesch v. Abrasive Co. of Phila.,
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still prevails; in mal-practice cases there has been no relaxation of the
requirement that plaintiff must show a deviation from the standards
of the profession. 1
The rule just discussed should be distinguished from that which
allows evidence of custom, practice, and the like, to be admitted as
tending to show what is careful conduct. By giving plaintiffs an addi-
tional source of evidence to show negligence, it increases their chances
of getting to the jury, and therefore the likelihood of a recovery -2
Moreover, in terms of the fault principle it is analytically sound to
allow such evidence because it has a logical bearing on the issue. 3
The trend of decisions both before and since the war has been quite
uniform in allowing such evidence."
Before the war the movement away from specific standards had
met two major counter-currents, in the form of statutory standards
of conduct, and the "guest" statutes. A majority of American courts
had adopted the rule that where a statute or ordinance prescribed a
standard of conduct for the protection of individuals against some
type of danger, the violation of that statute or ordinance constituted
negligence per se towards those individuals with reference to danger
of that type; this even where the statute provided criminal sanctions
only and made no reference to civil liability.5 Because of the extensive
adoption of detailed traffic regulations by statute and ordinance, this
rule gave fixed standards of conduct a new lease on life and operated to
restrict liability as the application of fixed standards usually does. An
alternative rule adopted in a minority of states regarded the provisions
of criminal statutes and ordinances as evidence of what due care re-
quired, to be considered by the jury much as custom or practice would
183 S. IV. (2d) 140 (Mo. 1944). The retention of the rule for master and kerant cares bas
little significance in an age of workanen's compensation statutes.
61. For recent treatment of the rule applied in these cases see Swan, California Law of
Malpractice (1945) 33 CALn. L. Rnv. 248; Arthur, Soeic Lifa lities of the Physician in the
Use of Drugs (1945) 17 Roc'y MT. L. REv. 131.
62. Of course techniques for showing negligence are equally available to show contribu-
tory negligence. But practically they do not do defendants as much good because of the
tendency of juries to resolve doubts in favor of the plaintiffs. Cf, note 48, supra.
63. 2 WIGmORE, EVIMENCE (3d ed. 1940) § 461. An encellent recent analyzis of the
problem is to be found in Morris, Custom and Neglige ce (1942) 42 CoL. L. RE%. 1147. Of
course in any given case a particular custom may so obviously represent all that can reacon-
ably be required in the way of precautions that its observance should not Le characterized
as negligence. C f. note 52, supra. On the other hand a custom may be so cearly dangeroutL
as to be entitled to no weight. Witiak v. Delaware & H. R. R., 59 F. Supp. 1009 (M. D. Pa.
1945).
64. The cases cited in note 53, supra, permit evidence of custom. Accord, Higgins v.
Conn. L. & P. Co., 129 Conn. 606, 30 A. (2d) 383 (1943); Smith v. Thompson, 349 o. 396,
161 S. IV. (2d) 232 (1942). Note (1943) 8 Mo. L. REv. 227, 297.
65. An analysis which has had great influence is that in Thayer, Putic Wrong ard
Prirate Action (1914) 27 HAnv. L. REv. 317. See also -LRPER, LAW Or Ton (1933) § 73;
PROSSER, TORTS (1941) § 39.
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be. 6 The majority rule was not absolutely rigid. Under it the violator
of a statute could resist the imputation of negligence by showing that
he did all one reasonably could to obey the statute, or that he acted
in an emergency. 7 Still the rule was often employed mechanically 11
and it was subjected to some fairly searching criticism. 9 After all,
the legislature did not expressly provide civil liability for breach of
the statute, and it may well have supposed that undue harshness from
its literal application as a criminal statute would be taken care of as
such matters generally are in the criminal law, through the use of
common sense discretion by the enforcement officers. It seems more
in keeping with legislative intent, therefore, and more reasonable for
the court to rely upon a: legislative standard in a civil case only where
it finds that standard appropriate. Moreover a court might find ap-
propriate a legislative standard which is not actually enforceable as a
matter of criminal law in the precise situation presented. One writer
who espouses this point of view feels that the court should apply as
fixed standards all rules of this nature which it thus adopts." But this
does not necessarily follow unless one agrees with Holmes' purpose of
promoting legal standards." If the standard is not one to be applied
inflexibly in the civil case, there seems to be no reason why the court
should not do any one of three things: reject the statutory standard
66. Landry v. Hubert, 101 Vt. 111, 141 Atl. 593 (1928); Wynn v. Sullivan, 294 Mass.
562, 3 N. E. (2d) 236 (1936). Any benefit which might otherwise accrue from this rule for
plaintiffs in Massachusetts is more than offset by as quaintly reactionary a rule as may be
found in tort law today. A plaintiff will be barred of recovery if his injury is a direct result
of conduct which violates a statute, even though that conduct amounts to the exercise of
due care. Newcomb v. Boston Protective Dept., 146 Mass. 596 (1888); Patrican v. Garvey,
287 Mass. 62, 190 N. E. 9 (1934) (plaintiff, aged eleven, expressly found to be in exercise of
due care). The notion is that a lawbreaker has no standing to ask for relief at the hands of
the court, even though his violation be so innocent and technical that he would not have to
pay damages to one who was injured by it. In the nature of things this rule works only
against accident victims. It is a barbarous relic of all the worst there was in Puritanism.
Contrast Rapee v. Beacon Hotel Corp., 293 N. Y. 196, 56 N. E. (2d) 548 (1944).
67. Evers v. Davis, 86 N. J. L. 196, 90 Atl.. 677 (1914). Cases collected in (notes)
24 A. L. R. 1304; 63 A. L. R. 277. Cf. Notes (1939) 14 WASU. L. R. 232; (1940) 38 Micii.
L. R. 801.
68. This might happen in either of two ways. Sometimes a statutory precaution would
be insisted on though it was practically impossible of reasonable fulfillment. Andrew v.
White Line Bus Corp., 115 Conn. 464, 161 Atl. 792 (1932); Conrad v. Springfield Consol,
Ry. Co., 240 Il1. 12, 88 N. E. 180 (1909) (defendant not allowed to show that statutory
precaution would render condition more dangerous). At other times a statutory precaution
would not even be considered because for some technical reason the statute did not apply
to the precise situation before the court. Moore v. Dering Coal Co., 242 Ill. 84, 89 N. E.
674 (1909).
69. Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation (1932) 16 MiNN. L. R. 361;
Morris, The Relation of Criminal Statutes to Tort Liability (1933) 46 HARv. L. R. 453.
70. Morris, op. cit. supra, note 69.
71. See note 49, supra.
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as inappropriate; adopt the statutory standard as a matter of law; 72
or else leave the statutory standard to the jury for their consideration
when reasonable men might differ as to its appropriateness under all
the circumstances. 73 This may well be the long way round to the view
that breach of statute is merely evidence of negligence. I have dwelt
on it at length because it may well represent what the majority rule
will actually come to. Developments in three important jurisdictions
which formerly espoused the negligence per se theory suggest this.
In two thoughtful opinions the California Supreme Court has adopted
at least part of the foregoing analysis. In Clinkscales v. Carer,74 de-
fendant went through a stop sign posted under an ordinance which
was invalid for defective publication. The court held that even if there
could be no criminal punishment, "the legislative standard may never-
theless apply if it is an appropriate measure for the defendant's con-
duct." 75 The court adopted the standard and applied it here as a
fixed one, for "otherwise a stop-sign would become a trap to innocent
persons who rely upon it." Two judges dissented because they felt
the whole issue should be left to the jury. It is not entirely clear
whether the majority thought the appropriateness of the standard
should be left to the jury when it is in doubt, but a later decision sug-
gests that this may be the rule.7
In many jurisdictions, of course, no such developments as those
described have taken place, and the former rules are still applied.?-
72. In Minnesota, a statute has reversed the negligence per se rule so far as statutory
rules of the road for traffic are concerned. Minn. Laws 1937, c. 464, § 141; Laws 1939, c. 430,
§ 30. This makes violation of traffic laws "prima facie evidence of negligence only." The
unexplained and unexcused breach of a statutory rule of conduct is still negligence as matter
of law, Wojtowicz v. Belden, 211 Minn. 461, 1 N. W. (2d) 409 (1942), but presumably any
evidence making it doubtful whether the statute should be applied would go to the jury.
73. The New York Court of Appeals, on the eve of the war, allowed a jury to say
whether it was negligent for a pedestrian, in violation of statute, to walk with the current
of traffic on a divided highway at a time when virtually all the traffic was using the other
lane. Tedla v. Ellman, 280 N. Y. 124, 19 N. E. (2d) 987 (1939), 34 ILL. L. RV. 229; (1939)
17 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. 143; (1939) 18 Tmx. L. RE,,. 102. Two judges dis ented on the au-
thority of Martin v. Herzog, 228 N. Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920). Thus the court decided
that the statutory standard might be appropriate in the civil case, but because there were
factors tending to explain or excuse its violation the jury was allowed to determine whether
the statutory standard was actually appropriate.
74. 22 Cal. (2d) 72, 136. P. (2d) 777 (1943), (1944) 32 CALnw. L. Ra,. 80; contrast
Rodenkirch v. Nemnick, 168 S. IV. (2d) 977 (Mo. App. 1943), 8 Mo. L. Rnv. 216, where a
similar question was left to the jury. Contrast also DuBois v. Johnson, 23S WIs. 161, 293
N. V. 590 (1941) where the court held that a "rolling stop" rather than a complete stop,
though a violation of criminal law could not be a cause of collision.
75. Compare Black v. Stith, 164 Ore. 117, 100 P. (2d) 485 (1940).
76. In Polk v. Los Angeles, 159 P. (2d) 931 (Cal. 1945) it was held proper to have called
to the jury's attention safety rules promulgated by the Railroad Commizion. Even if theze
rules were technically inapplicable (the court did not think they were) the court caw no
reason why they should not be applied to a publicly owned as well as to a private utility.
77. Thus in Bushnell v. Telluride Power Co., 145 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) a
directed verdict for plaintiff was upheld where damage was caused by a fire kindled without
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As to guest statutes, they too cut across the. stream of expanding
liability, by relaxing the duty owed by one class of defendants to one
class of personal injury plaintiffs. About half the states had already
adopted guest statutes before the war and of these only Connecticut,
the first state to- adopt one has since repealed it.78 Two states have
extended their guest statutes to airplanes.79 The general character of
the duty owed to guests, already pretty well defined, has not undergone
any important modification."0 Some questions were presented as to
who is a guest, in connection with ride-sharing agreements. On the
whole these were worked out along conventional lines, the ride-sharer
under a regular arrangement to pay ratably towards expenses, being
held a passenger rather than a guest, and so outside the scope of the
statute."' These holdings will be of less practical use after the war
because insurance policies do not ordinarily cover the carrying of
persons for a charge; these clauses being suspended at the govern-
ment's request for the emergency only. 2
the required written permit, in spite of evidence that all reasonable precautions were taken,
that defendant had the warden's oral permission, etc., and in Alpine Tel. Corp. v. McCall,
143 Tex. 335, 184 S. IV. (2d) 830 (1944) violation of an ordinance was held negligence per se,
But cf. Taber v. Smith 26 S. W. (2d) 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) where factors of excuse were
shown.
In spite of some earlier cases to the contrary it is now generally held that conformity to
the statutory standard does not establish due care as a matter of law. Icentz v. Charles
Dennery, Inc., 17 So. (2d) 506 (La. App., 1944), 19 TULANE L. REV. 300; Pratt, Read & Co.
v. New York N. H. & H. R. R., 102 Conn. 735, 130 Atl. 102 (1925).
A case involving intelligent application of the evidence of negligence rule is Harsha v.
Bowles, 51 N. E. (2d) 454 (Mass. 1943).
78. CONN. GEN. STAT. (Supp. 1939) § 540e, passed in 1937. The statutes are collected
in Weber, Guest Statutes (1937) 11 U. OF CIN. L. REV. 24, which also contains a good treat-
ment of the kind of showing required in these cases. A recent change in the wording of the
Indiana statute, Acts, 1937, c. 259, § 1, seems to have wrought no change in substance.
Bedwell v. DeBolt, 221 Ind. 600, 50 N. E. (2d) 875 (1943), (1944) 19 IND. L. J. 145.
79. California and South Carolina. Note (1945) 30 IowA L. REV. 442; Whittemore v.
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 51 Cal. App. (2d) 605, 125 P. (2d) 531 (1942), (1943) 16 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 358.
80. Gordon, Tort Liability in Ride-Sharing Arrangements (1944) 38 ILL. L. REV. 293;
Spikes, Gross Negligence Under the Guest 'Statute (1943) 22 NEB. L. REV. 264; Campbell,
Host-Guest Rules in Wisconsin (1943) Wis. L. REv. 180.
81. Miller v. Fairley, 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N. E. (2d) 217 (1943), 29 CORN. L. Q. 87,
23 B. U. L. REv. 513; Gordon, Tort Liability in Ride-Sharing Arrangements (1944) 38 ILL.
L. REv. 293. Cf. Thuente v. Hart Motors, 234 Iowa 1294, 15 N. W. (2d) 622 (1944), (1945)
30 IowA L. REv. 283 (where owner of car and passengers were both engaged in Scrap drive
held latter not a guest). In Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash. (2d) 561, 143 P. (2d) 554 (1943),
(1944) 19 WAsH. L. REV. 42, the court held that the sharing of expenses of a trip under an
informal agreement to do so did not make the parties joint-venturers. The passenger here
asked to be taken on the trip. The purpose of each party was a separate social one. The
court overruled Manos v. James, 7 Wash. (2d) 695, 110 P. (2d) 887 (1941), but left open the
question whether plaintiff was a passenger for hire.
82. Note (1943) 29 CORN. L. Q. 87; Gordon, supra note 81. But cf. Bonham v. Zurich
Ins. Co. (1945) 1 ALL ENG. R. 427 (holding a share-the-rider who paid the amount of rail-
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(b) Scope of duty. One of the most obvious ways in which to broaden
tort liability has been through the extension of the scope of duty.
The duty to use care in the performance of affirmative conduct has
long been measured by the test of foreseeability of harm. Develop-
ments in this field have not involved an abandonment or modification
of this test but rather a fuller recognition of what is reasonably fore-
seeable in an age of mechanical advancement and a slowly spreading
social conscience,-3 and a progressive repudiation of some older and
rather arbitrary limitations on the principle.3 4
In a well-reasoned opinion the Michigan Supreme Court has decided
that a defendant who by his negligence puts himself in peril has
breached a duty to his rescuer who is injured while taking reasonable
steps to save him.85 This seems to be the first decision of its kind.
Older authority had denied recovery because the defendant was
thought to owe no duty to himself." But that is not the issue. The
rescuer's right is not derivative. The reasonable impulse to rescue is
one of the things an actor is bound to take into account. He must not
by substandard conduct bring this impulse into play, and this duty is
owed directly to the potential rescuer. It should be of no consequence
that as one step in the process defendant puts himself in peril rather
than someone else, or some personal property,'
It is now generally recognized that the actor may be required to
foresee the actions of third persons even where they are negligent or
criminal if a reasonable man would do so under the circumstances.13
road fare to the owner not to be carried for "hire or reward" .ithin the terms of a policy).
Restrictions on insurance coverage are particulazly important in this field because the rela-
tionship between passenger and driver is often of a kind which diEcourages the willingnezi
to satisfy liability out of personal assets, even where there are any.
83. Typical of modern cases which require a man in a trade or bus inLs to acquire a
special knowledge about the things he handles or the techniques he uses from which he may
foresee harm that would be concealed from one without such knowledge, are Combroo!z v.
Terminal Barber Shops, 282 N. Y. 217, 26 N. E. (2d) 25 (1940) and Noone v. Fred Perlbrg,
268 App. Div. 149,49 N. Y. S. (2d) 460 (lst Dep't 1944), ajfd 294 N. Y. 6SO, 60 N. E. (2d)
839 (1945). In the former a barber was held bound to know that using a vibrator over the
closed eye might cause detachment of the retina. In the latter a manufacturer was held
bound to know that sizing he used for dresses was highly inflammable so that it flared up
when touched by a live cigarette.
84. HARPER, LAw OF TORTS (1933) c. 6; PROSSER, ToRas (1941) c. 6.
85. Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mlich. 74, 16 N. WV. (2d) 668 (1944), (1945) 43 Micu. L.
Rnv. 980.
86. Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 670, 9S N. W. S00 (1904).
87. PROSSER, ToRTs (1941) 360; Morgan v. Aylen (1942) 1 AL E.zo. R. 480, (1942)
58 L. Q. Rsv. 298; Steel v. Glasgow Iron & Steel Co. (1944) 237 Sess. Cas., (1945) 61 L. Q.
Rav. 27.
88. Thus a truck driver who had the green light in his favor was held negligent in not
seeing an automobile negligently speeding towards the interzection. ientz v. Charles
Dennery, 17 So. (2d) 506 (La. App. 1944). And in Cusatis v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 152 Pa.
Super. 193, 31 A. (2d) 572 (1943) defendant 'as held liable for spotting a car without ctting
1946]
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Indeed there is nothing new in this 9 and it would scarcely be worth
noting if it were not for a competing notion that in such a situation
only the last wrongdoer may be held.9" The last-wrongdoer rule has
never prevailed generally as a limitation on duty, but it keeps cropping
up to this day, often in the guise of a transparent statement that
certain wrongful conduct which every prudent man actually guards
against is not "foreseeable." 91 When it does prevail, the last wrong-
doer rule limits the number of persons whom plaintiff can hold liable
for an injury, often insulating from liability the only financially re-
sponsible wrongdoer in the case. In this respect the older, more re-
strictive rule has a practical effect something like that which follows
from a refusal to impose vicarious liability. And the abandonment of
the restriction gives to accident victims a wider choice of defendants,
therefore a greater chance of finding a financially responsible one, just
as an extension of vicarious liability does.
This competition between the last wrongdoer limitation and the
rule which holds a defendant to anticipate all that is reasonably fore-
seeable is also seen in cases where because of contract, calling, or other
relationship, a defendant has come under a duty to take affirmative
precautions towards some class of people. These precautions may
include those necessary to protect plaintiff from the foreseeable wrong-
ful acts of third persons for whose conduct defendant is not otherwise
responsible. Thus officers of a corporation have been held under a'
duty to take care to prevent one of their number who was belligerently
drunk from shooting a union representative who was an invitee on
the premises.9 And a railroad in whose station hoboes were accus-
tomed to loiter was found negligent for failing to provide guards to
the derail which would have prevented the car from rolling onto a crossing when handled
negligently by the consignee's workmen. And it may be negligent to furnish young children
with gasoline, Yachuk v. Oliver Blais Co., (1944) 3 D. L. R. 615, or a BB gun, Mazzocchi v.
Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S. E. (2d) 12 (1944), 22 N. C. L. REv. 333, though the harm comes
only when the children misbehave. Cf. also Ross v. Hartman, 139 F. (2d) 14 (App. D. C.
1943).
89. It was accepted, for instance, in Illidge v. Goodwin, 5 C. & P. 190, 172 Eng. Rep.
R. 934 (C. P. 1831).
90. Vicars v. Wilcocks, 8 East 1, 103 Eng. Rep. R. 244 (K. B. 1806); Bohlen, Conlribu-
tory Negligence (1908) 21 HARV. L. REv. 233; SIVULMAN AND JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORTS (1942) 297.
91. Slater v. T. C. Baker Co., 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927); Noll v. Marian,
347 Pa. 213, 32 A. (2d) 18 (1943). Pennsylvania has adopted the rule that if the later of
two wrongdoers becomes aware of the danger created to the first, and is thereafter negli-
gent, the later wrongdoer alone is liable. Venorick v. Revetta, 152 Pa. Super. 455, 33 A.
(2d) 655 (1943), (1944) 42 MicH. L. REv. 709, 48 DicK. L. REv. 114; Eldredge, Culpable
Intervention as Superseding Cause (1937) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. 121. This rule is really con-
cerned with liability for breach of duty rather than with the question whether a duty has
been breached. It is a matter of "proximate cause."
92. In re Sabbatino & Co., 150 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 2d, 1945), 31 VA. L. REv. 937.
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prevent assault on women passengers. °" But in 'Vol! v. Marian 9, the
Pennsylvania court thought that a bank holdup Nas not the sort of
thing that was sufficiently foreseeable to warrant a jury in concluding
that the bank should train its tellers to meet the exigency.
As we have seen, statutes have come to play an important part as
the basis of duties. The scope of a statutory provision and its rele-
vance to the grounds of civil liability depend upon a judicial inter-
pretation of the statute's purpose. Thus the New York State War
Emergency Act which (among other things) forbade lights showing
during a blackout was held to create no duty tow.ards the air raid
warden who was injured while climbing to put them out.05 But even
where a statute creates a duty to individuals there is usually room for
construing the duty broadly or narrowly. Some recent cases illustrate
this. The defendant leaves his car in a public street unlocked, in
violation of statute or ordinance; the car is stolen, and while being
operated as a stolen car negligently injures the plaintiff within a few
hours of the theft. In Ross v. Hartman, the District of Columbia
court noted that the requirement to lock cars was found among pro-
visions for safety devices such as horns, brakes, lights, and the like for
vehicles generally (including bicycles). But the provision for locks
applied only to motor vehicles. It concluded that the provision was
not to prevent theft for the sake of owners or the police "but to pro-
mote safety of the public in the streets. Aht unlocked motor vehicle
93. Neering v. Illinois Cent. R. R., 383 IUl. 366, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 (1943), 38 ILL. L.
REv. 213, (1944) 22 Cm-K-NT L. R~v. 152. Other recent cases illustrate anew the conven-
tional extent of this basis of liability. Thus if there is no reason to anticipate the wrongful
act of another, there is no duty to guard against it or take it into account. Pennsylvania
R. R. v. Cook, 26 A. (2d) 384 (Md. App. 1942), (1943) 6 ID. L. Ruv. 332 (paszenger pulled
signal to start train); Shepard v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 236 Mlo. App. 1118, 162 S. W.
(2d) 318 (1942); Frace v. Long Beach City High School Dist., 3 Cal. App. (2d) 566, 137 P.
(2d) 60 (1943) (janitor gave key of place where chemicals were stored to student who stole
some which exploded). And of course the evidence may show all reasonable precautions
were taken. Duner v. Hudson & Man. R. R., 264 App. Div. 229, 35 N. Y. S. (2d) 191 (1st
Dep't 1942) (assault on passenger at station; but 28 policemen then on guard there); cf.
Brodie v. Miller, 24 Tenn. App. 316, 143 S. NV. (2d) 1042 (1940). In Rose v. City of Chicago,
317 Ill. App. 1, 45 N. E. (2d) 717 (1942), a taxi company was held liable for injuries inflicted
on a passenger by strikers where it had reason to anticipate violence and had taken no steps
to warn passengers of this fact. In Hansen v. Henrici's, 319 Ill. App. 453, 49 N. E. (2d)
737 (1943), (1944) 22 Cam.-KENr L. REv. 164, a restaurateur was held when young men
in a hurry pushed too hard a revolving door which hurt plaintiff.
94. 347 Pa. 213, 32 A. (2d) 18 (1943).
95. Klein v. Herlim Realty Corp., 184 Misc. 852, 54 N. Y. S. (2d) 144 (Sup. Ct. 1945).
In Picou v. J. B. Luke's Sons, 204 La. 831, 16 So. (2d) 466 (1943) a child labor statute vas
found intended only to prevent interference vith education and not to promote cafety. In
Picking v. Pennsylvania R. R., 151 F. (2d) 240 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945), the Uniform Criminal
Extradition Act was found to create no civil rights for wrongful arrect.
96. 139 F. (2d) 14 (App. D. C. 1943).
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creates little more risk of theft than an unlocked bicycle, or for that
matter, an unlocked house, but it creates much more risk that meddling
by children, thieves, or others will result in injuries to the public." In
Slater v. T. C. Baker & Company," under a similar provision and a sim-
ilar state of facts, the Massachusetts court instead had exonerated the
defendant as a matter of law because "the larceny of the automobile
and its use by the thief were intervening independent acts which the
defendant was not bound to anticipate and to guard against." The rule
of the Slater case has recently been reaffirmed. 8
The rule that no one is legally bound to be a good Samaritan is
familiar enough. Familiar, too, are the exceptions to it. Typical of
these is Szabo v. Pennsylvania Railroad 11 where an employee had a
sun stroke on the job and the foreman simply ordered him to be taken
home without seeing that he got first aid or was put into the hands of
his family. His family was out and he was left home to die for want
of attention. Liability was imposed. The decision in L. S. Ayres &
Company v. Hicks 109 perhaps goes a little farther. A child who went
with his mother to the store got his hand caught in the comb-plate
where the steps of an escalator meet the floor. While the jury found the
97. 261 Mass. 424, 158 N. E. 778 (1927).
98. Sullivan v. Griffin, 318 Mass. -, 61 N. E. (2d) 330 (1945). Malloy v. Newman,
310 Mass. 269, 37 N. E. (2d) 100.1 (1941), (1942) 22 B. U. L.REv. 331, deals with a similar
situation but in addition the auto was not properly registered. Here the Massachusetts
court held that violation of the registration statutes put defendant "outside the pale of
travellers," and rendered the car a trespasser on the highway so that all the conduct of its
owner-operator was permeated with unlawfulness. This was felt to provide the sound basis
of liability that breach of the lock statute did not, and defendant was held for the death
caused when a thief (not eluding pursuers) was driving the car at 80 miles an hour. The
Slater case was distinguished on the ground that here the owner was shown to know the
danger of thefts in the neighborhood. The opinion is confusing, and if it stood alone it
might be taken to have effectually overruled the Slater case, supra, note 97; see Note (1944)
92 U. oF PA. L. Rv. 467. But any doubt on this score is set at rest by Sullivan v. Griffin,
supra, which leaves nothing to the Malloy case but the point about registration.
99. 132 N. J. L. 331, 40 A. (2d) 562 (1945), 19 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 161. The decision
may stand for the duty of an employer to give emergency first aid, or for the proposition
that he who undertakes to give voluntary aid comes under the duty to use care not to leave
the injured person worse off than he would have been if left alone.
100. 220 Ind. 86, 40 N. E. (2d) 334 (1942), (1943) 8 Mo. L. Rv. 205. Compare Con-
nelly v. Kaufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261, 37 A. (2d) 125 (1944) where the facts were
almost the same. The court rejects the moral considerations which appealed to the Indiana
court, but holds there could be liability because the duty owed to invitees includes the duty
of proper operation of escalators, and "The proper management of such operation neces-
sarily involved stopping the machine if emergency required." Id. at 265, 37A. (2d) 125, 127.
In Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S. W. (2d) 784 (1941), on retrial 237 Mo. App.
690, 157 S. W. (2d) 259 (1941), defendant whose train blocked the crossing was held for
failure of a brakeman to shout a warning to an approaching motorist seen to be unaware
of danger. Recovery was put on the humanitarian rule, and there was evidence of failure
to give signals before the train occupied the crossing but the reasoning of the court seems to
minimize the importance of this "primary negligence."
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condition was not negligent defendant was held for its failure to stop
the escalator within a reasonable time after the injury. The court
thought there was an affirmative duty to rescue because plaintiff was
defendant's invitee and because the injury resulted from the use of an
instrumentality under its control. Authorities resting the duty on
such a basis have been equivocal, though commentators are united in
thinking it should be imposed.''
Where a defendant is in business and prepares a part of his premises
for the accommodation of those members of the public who come there
for a purpose connected with that business, it is becoming increasingly
doubtful whether defendant can discharge his duty to such invitees
by simply making a dangerous condition of the premises perfectly
obvious. It is true that an ordinary arrangement of the premises such
as a step, a revolving door, or a ramp, 02 is not of itself negligent even
though it may ocassionally cause injury. But if there is something
about the arrangement or the condition of it which may be thought
unreasonably dangerous, courts are likely to find negligence even
though the condition is perfectly obvious. 1 3
The duty owed by a landowmer, to a policeman, fireman, or other
officer, entering the premises in the course of his duty has been the
subject of divergent attitudes in two cases. The Minnesota court
insists that a fire inspector is a licensee only and may not recover for
injuries caused by the defective nosing on the step of a stairway not
used by or maintained for the public but only for employees to bring
goods from the basement storeroom to the ground floor.'
101. See POSSER, TORTS (1941) 193 and note 30.
102. Cameron v. Small, 132 S. V. (2d) 565 (Mo. 1944); Weidanz v. May Dep't Stores
Co., 156 S. W. (2d) 44 (Mo. App. 1941); Connelly v. I.aufmann & Baer Co., 349 Pa. 261,
37 A. (2d) 125 (1944) (escalator).
103. Walgreen-Texas Co. v. Shivers, 137 Tex. 493, 154 S. W. (2d) 625 (1941) (defendant
had placed its counter stools on a raised platform instead of on the floor); Weingarten v.
Brockman, 134 Tex. 451, 135 S. W. (2d) 698 (Comm. App. 1940) (place adjoining sidevalk
a little raised); Delmore v. Polinsky, 132 Conn. 28, 42 A. (2d) 349 (1945) (stairs leading
from main floor to basement protected only by newel posts). See Malone, Contributory
Negligezce and the Lamlowner Cases (1945) 29 MuN. L. R rv. 61, 83, 87. Cf. Safeway Stores
v. Whitehead, 190 Okla. 464, 125 P. (2d) 194 (1942). But cf. Weidanz v. Mlay Dep't Stores
Co., 156 S. IV. (2d) 44 (Mo. App. 1941).
Of course the obvious nature of a defect may have a bearing on contributory negligence,
but in the cases cited above the plaintiff's conduct seems to be evaluated just about as is
that of a user of the highway where the duty of the municipality extends to even the most
obvious dangerous conditions. Particularly helpful analysis of the contributory negligence
factor in landowner cases and its interrelationship with the duties of the defendants is found
in Malone, supra.
In Cassanova v. Paramount-Richards Theatres, 204 La. 813, 16 So. (2d) 444 (19-13),
there is a well-considered treatment of the duties of movie theatre owners to their patrons.
See also -Malone, supra, at 84. Recent trends in Texas landowner cases are outlined in Com-
ment (1944) 22 TEx. L. RPv. 489.
104. Mlulcrone v. Wagner, 212 Minn. 478, 4 N. W. (2d) 97 (1942). While, as the court
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The Appellate Court of Illinois, on the other hand, has handed
down a progressively reasoned opinion allowing recovery for the death
of a policeman who was run down while on tracks in a passenger station
yard by a train backed at negligent speed without lights or lookout.
The decedent had just apprehended a thief after chasing him onto
railroad property, and was taking the thief under arrest to the police
station. While the court was willing to let a jury find defendant's
conduct wilful or wanton, it ruled that deceased was not a trespasser
or mere licensee but was on defendant's premises as of right and that
defendant was therefore obligated to the use of reasonable care towards
him. 0 5
A similar divergence of view is found in two cases where the so-
called "attractive nuisance" doctrine was invoked. In Thompson v.
Reading Company,"'0 a turntable case, the Pennsylvania court in a
thoughtful opinion concludes that the bases of the doctrine are likeli-
hood of presence and of harm, and the value of a child's life to the
community. The court rejects "allurement" as a mechanical test,
though it recognizes that it may properly be a factor in determining the
likelihood that children will come and be hurt. The Kentucky court,
on the other hand, apparently still insists on "allurement." 101
(c) Proof of the breach. Where there is direct evidence of what the
parties did, any questions of credibility are usually for the jury. In
certain situations, however, artificial rules have developed, which
require something more in the way of proof than would be enough to
satisfy the ordinary process of logical reasoning. Some jurisdictions
even today, for instance, have a special rule where a passenger is
injured by the unusual jerk or jolt of the car in which he is riding. The
plaintiff who can only describe the jerk by using adjectives and by
testifying that it broke his hand grip on a seat and threw him from a
standing position to the floor cannot even get to the jury.' There
points out, the facts of the case made it clearly distinguishable from Melers v. Fred Koch
Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920), yet the reasoning of the Mejers case is also
rejected as deviating from the dominant rule.
105. Ryan v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 315 Ill. App. 65, 42 N. E. (2d) 128 (1942). The
court adopts the analysis presented by the opinion in Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229
N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920), and by Bohlen, The Duty of a Landowner Towards Those
Entering His Premises of Their Own Right (1921) 69 U. OF PA. L. Rlv. 142, 237, 340. In tile
Meiers case a fireman entering on premises to extinguish a fire was injured by falling into an
unlighted and unguarded coal hole extending half way across a driveway, upon business
premises, "prepared for the use of those who had business with the defendant." Defendant
was held bound to use care to keep such parts of such premises reasonably safe, and this
duty was owed to the fireman.
106. 343 Pa. 585, 23 A. (2d) 729 (1942). The court relies on and quotes at length some
very excellent passages from the PENNSYLVANIA ANNOTATIONS TO THE RESTATEMENT OF
THE LAW OF TORTS (1938).
107. Jones v. Louisville & Nash. R. R., 297 Ky. 197, 179 S. W. (2d) 874 (1944).
108. Coyle v. Pittsburgh Ry., 149 Pa. Super. 281, 27 A. (2d) 533 (1942); Monahan v.
Pittsburgh Ry., 149 Pa. Super. 283, 27 A. (2d) 534 (1942); Hawkins v. Pittsburgh Ry.,
146 Pa. Super. 185, 22 A. (2d) 73 (1941).
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must be corroboration, such as a showing that other passengers, too,
were thrownm, and it is not enough corroboration to state that the plain-
tiff's own injury must have been caused "by a lot of force," and that
all the passengers "sort of crumpled." 1 It will be enough, however,
if the plaintiff can link the unusual jerk with some other specific negli-
gence in operating the car, such as excessive speed around a curve.110
The policy behind such a rule is protection against false claims too
easily fabricated."' But the danger of such a policy is that meritorious
claims will be penalized through mistrust in the ability of judges and
juries to find the truth, and some courts have thought this the greater
evil.112
Where proof of what occurred is supplied circumstantially, the gov-
erning rule is easy enough to formulate. It is stated in terms of mathe-
matical precision. "If the plaintiff cannot show the possibility of a
conclusion of defendant's negligence supported by a clear preponder-
ance of its likelihood . ..and excluding other probabilities just as
reasonable . .. the plaintiff should not be permitted to go to the
jury."'" 3 Difficulty comes from the fact that anything even remotely
adunbrating accurate statistical knowledge about the relative prob-
abilities in even the most commonly recurring situations is completely
lacking. Of course some generalizations would command wide, even
universal, acceptance. These are the judgments of "common sense."
109. Hawkins v. Pittsburgh Ry., 146 Pa. Super. 135,22 A. (2d) 73 (1941).
110. Tuckerv. Pittsburgh Ry., 153 Pa. Super. 63,33 A. (2d) 441 (1943).
111. See Cardozo, Ch. J., in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 230 N. Y. 479,
432, 166 N. E. 173, 174 (1929) ("He cannot help himself to a verdict by the .. facile
comment that it threw him with a jerk.")
A note to the Pennsylvania cases discussed above, notes 103, 109, 110, (1944) 43 Dicmr.
L. REV. 109, suggests that with present day transportation and its speed a certain amount
of jerking and jolting is unavoidable and to be expected so that any more lenient rule would
make it impossible for street railmays to operate. But this confuses standard of conduct
and proof of the breach. The substantive law should and does reflect the policy mentioned,
and the carrier will be held only for extraordinary jerks and jolts. The rule in question is
concerned with the measure of proof required to make out what is admittedly a wrong.
In that respect it is like other rules found elsewhere in our law. See discusaion of Gynthetic
(or quantitative) rules in WIGmOxRE, EVWENcE (3d. ed. 1940) §§ 2030-73.
112. Belledeau v. Connecticut Co., 110 Conn. 625, 149Ati. 127 (1930).
113. Nash v. Raun, 149 F. (2d) 885, 883 (C. C. A. 3d, 1945). This rule is to b2 differen-
tiated from that applied by the trier of facts. The court must determine whether the exist-
ence of fact A (which has been testified to) is more probably than not, as a gerral*:ation,
attended by the coexistence of fact B (which is sought to be inferred). If the court makes
this initial determination in favor of the legitimacy of the inference, the iszue goes to the
jury to determine whether upon the preponderance of the evidence in tThs case they find
(1) that fact A did cxist and, if so, (2) whether fact B did exist (again, if nTis cas).
The rule dealt with here is that by which the court tests the sufficiency of circurnztantial
evidence. It is often expressed thus, where from the facts most favorable to plaintiff the
nonexistence of the fact to be inferred is just as probable as its existence, the conclusion that
it exists is a matter of speculation, surmise, and conjecture and a jury will not be permitted
to draw it. See PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 292.
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But even here it is not safe to forget how often the science of the mor-
row makes the commonsense of the day seem foolish. Moreover the
area is vast wherein thoughtful men who accept today's common sense
would either disagree or refuse to guess on which side of the line the
greater probability lies. All that has been said has not, quite properly,
prevented the law from constantly coming to conclusions about cir-
cumstantial proof. But it does mean that the authoritative language
of nice and scientific precision in which such conclusions are cast is
after all only the language of delusive exactness. And it does mean
that throughout the field of circumstantial proof there is not a little
room for considerations of policy and expediency to play a part in
choosing between two very fallible and equally undemonstrable gen-
eralizations about the balance of probability.
As a general rule, the more detailed and specific are the given facts,
the more sure-footed are our judgments as to the probability of the
existence of other facts, which we are asked to infer, and the less room
there is apt to be for those judgments to be dictated by the desirability,
for one reason or another, of an end result. Yet there is nearly always
some room at least for viewing the claimed inferences sympathetically
or otherwise." 4
Res ipsa loquitur is not usually invoked until a court is asked to draw
inferences from circumstances where many of the important given
facts are pretty general."' And where that is the case there is often
the widest latitude for choosing one premise or another concerning the
probabilities of negligence. So far as accountability to any genuinely
scientific standards go, it is a matter of dealer's choice, and the court
is the dealer. In this field it is far more important to see how and why
the court chooses its premise, than to note the arid fact that the final
conclusion is cast in the form of a syllogism which is just like that in
any other case of circumstantial evidence."'
As usually stated, the first condition necessary for the application of
the principle of res ipsa loquitur is that the accident must be of a kind
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negli-
gence." 7 An attempt to follow out the literal implications of this re-
114. This is well illustrated in Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital and Dispensary,
284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. (2d) 373 (1940), where though the New York Court of Appeals'
conclusions seem reasonable enough, the trial court and the Appellate Division had both
taken a narrower view of the evidence. Another illustrative contrast is that between Morri-
son v. Le Tourneau Co. of Ga., 138 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) and Eickhoff v. Beard-
Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20 S. E. (2d) 153 (1942).
115. In Eickhoff v. Beard-Laney, Inc., 199 S. C. 500, 20 S. E. (2d) 153, (1942) the court
takes pains to point out that South Carolina does not accept the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
116. But see PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 291-302; Prosser, The Procedural Effect of Res Ipsa
Loguitur (1936) 20 MiNN. L. REv. 241, 258. Of course examples can be chosen which em-
phasize the fact that the inference is sometimes one that all men would draw.
117. PROSSER, TORTs (1941) 295.
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quirement is seen in two recent California cases. In Honea v. City
Dairy,118 a milk bottle broke without apparent cause and injured the
plaintiff who was carrying it. The decision turned on whether the
accident would ordinarily occur without negligence. The court was
satisfied that a jury could infer that the bottle was defective; but since
there was no basis for saying that the defect was more likely to have
been reasonably preventable or discoverable than not, there was no
case for the jury. In Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Company,11 a bottle
burst just as unaccountably and again the decision depended upon the
application of the rule under discussion. The court thought the bottle
must have been overcharged or defective. As to the possibility of
overcharge, it was common knowledge that this would be negligent.
Common knowledge would not indicate whether a defect would prob-
ably be reasonably preventable or discoverable, but in this case there
was detailed testimony by the bottle manufacturer showing how its
tests for defects were almost fool-proof. This, the court thought,
showed that the bottle probably had no undisclosed defects when
delivered to defendant, and defects occurring after delivery vould
probably be discoverable. So there was a rational basis for finding that
if a defect caused the trouble it was a defect which defendant should
have found.
These cases represent a conscientious effort to enter upon the quest
for probabilities which the statement of the rule literally implies. They
point up several things: (1) that in the vast majority of decided cases
the court determines whether the res ipsa. loquitur principle applies
without having before it any such elaborate showing of the processes
and probabilities involved as are to be found in the Escola case; -'
(2) that the kind of evidence which goes to make such a showing is apt
to be peculiarly accessible to defendant; and (3) that even in the Escola
case this showing covered only one aspect of the matter, and the court
had to invoke common knowledge that bottles usually do not get over-
charged without negligence. This may, to be sure, be the case. The
overcharge probably points to something going wrong with the machine
or its operation. But here again, without the benefit of expert knowl-
edge, it is bold to assume that such a flaw would more probably than
not be preventible by due care. What is said is not in criticism of the
118. 22 Cal. (2d) 614, 140 P. (2d) 369 (1943).
119. 24 Cal. (2d) 453, 150 P. (2d) 436 (1944).
120. Of course the court had already decided that from common kmowledge alone it
could not be told whether defects in bottles probably showed negligence. In such a care it
was natural for the parties to make a showing like this and for the court to rest its deckion
upon it. Contrast the less resilient attitude of the Maine court which, when faced vith the
contention that scientific advances had rendered res ipsa loquitur appropriate in airplane
cases, replied that the courts are powerless to change the doctrine as "This would change a
rule of evidence into a rule of public policy." Deojay v. Lyford, 139 Me. 234, 241, 29 A.
(2d) 111, 114 (1942).
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California decisions. Courts should and do get all the light they can
on the questions of probability. They are not likely to invoke the rule
unless there seems a fair chance that the probabilities are as they
assume. But the initial decision must often be made without much
light, and the real problems are who should have the burden of shedding
whatever light is available, and whether defendant's enterprise or its
victims should bear the cost of injury from unexplained accidents of
the kind in question when there is no light to shed. The California
courts have been keen to recognize this and to invoke the doctrine
without much regard to the matter of probability where the policy of
the situation was felt to demand it. In .Judson v. Giant Powder Com-
pany 121 the court applied the doctrine to an unexplained explosion of a
powder factory. Expert evidence was offered that such explosions do
not occur without negligence. The court accepted the evidence but
disparaged its value and necessity (though it had the most direct bear-
ing on any issue of probability), remarking that since the making of
dynamite was lawful the court might assume that if dynamite is prop-
erly handled explosions will not probably occur.122 And in a very recent
case where defendant claimed that the doctrine did not apply to an in-
jury suffered under anaesthetic, the court replied "If this were the state
of the law of negligence, the courts, to avoid gross injustice, would be
forced to invoke the principles of absolute liability."' 23
121. Judson v. Giant Powder Co., 107 Cal. 549, 40 Pac. 1020 (1895).
122. In Koskela v. Albion Lumber Co., 25 Cal. App. 12, 142 Pac. 851 (1914), defendant's
employee was killed while being taken in a travelling chute from shore to ship, when there
was an unexplained break in the tackle. The court thought this showed a probability of
negligence because "It is inconceivable that defendant would have adopted these means
had they supposed that in the ordinary course of their operation, with proper care, such
accidents as the one here was likely to occur." Id. at 22, 142 Pac. 855. A moment's reflection
shows the fallacy of the statement and that in the Judson Powder Co. case. Industries con-
stantly adopt devices that are not yet foolproof, witness the airplane. Indeed if we are to
progress, that must be the case. The reasoning of the court but ill conceals the fact that
liability is being imposed on the defendant for unexplainable accidents without any real
knowledge at all as to the probabilities of negligence.
A high watermark of judicial candor on this point is to be found in Kleinman v. Banner
Laundry Co., 150 Minn. 515, 517-8, 186 N. W. 123, 124 (1921) where in a boiler explosion
case, Dibbell, J., said "Boilers sometimes explode. Comparing the number of explosions
with the extent of the use of boilers, explosions are not frequent. If they are kept in proper
condition and repair, and if they are operated properly explosions are unusual. Whether the
res ipsa doctrine which permits an inferenc6 of negligence from the fact of an explosion,
should apply, is largely a question of how justice in such cases is most practically and fairly
administered. There is nothing legally illogical in permitting the inference to be drawn.
Usually the party injured is without information upon which he may with certainty allege
the exact cause, and is without direct proof. Perhaps the exact cause is incapable of ascer-
tainment. The actual proof, if any, is with the party having the management of the instru-
mentality. These are practical considerations. We think the jury should have been per-
mitted to draw an inference of negligence of the laundry company from the occurrence of
the explosion. Though the holding may put us with the minority, we are content with it,"
123. Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 490, 154 P. (2d) 687, 689 (1944).
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Other recent bursting bottle cases indicate a trend in favor of apply-
ing the doctrine where its other conditions are met, but the former
split of authority continues.12 4 In the case of unexplained airplane
accidents there is still a marked reluctance to apply the principle, 1-3
though commentators continue to insist that aviation has now, pro-
gressed far enough so that it is fair to say accidents generally do not
happen without negligence. 12 For the rest, the rule seems to have
been applied in situations which fall well within precedent.1 '
A second requirement of the rule is that the injury must have been
caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control
of the defendant. 2 As usually applied, this simply means that there
must be a rational basis for finding that the negligence (inferable from
the type of accident) is that of defendant and not of another. In the
bursting bottle cases, for example, plaintiff must know that nothing
untoward happened to the bottle between the time it left defendant's
custody and the time it exploded.1-  And plaintiff vill fail if this proof
does not cover the vicissitudes of the bottle during part of that timeY
124. The doctrine was applied in Bradley v. Conway Springs Bottling Co., 154 Kan.
282, 118 P. (2d) 601 (1941); Ortego v. Nehi Bottling Vorks, 199 La. 599, 6 So. (2d) 677
(1942); Lanza v. De Ridder Coca Cola Bottling Co., 3 So. (2d) 217 (La. App. 1941); Berl:cn-
dorfer v. Garrett, 143 S. XV. (2d) 1020 (Tex. Civ. App. 1940). Contra: Berkens v. Denver
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 109 Colo. 140, 122 P. (2d) 884 (1942). Theze casez all dealt with
explosions. In Coralnick v. Abbotts Dairies, Inc. 337 Pa. 344, 11 A. (2d) 143 (19-0) the
doctrine was not applied where a milk bottle simply broke.
Several recent notes treat the question: (1943) 31 CAIEF. L. REv. C03; (1943) 42 Mica.
L. REv. S36; (1944) 17 So. C.A.rr. L. REv. 330.
125. Morrison v. Le Tourneau, 13S F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943); Deojay v. Lyford,
139 Me. 234, 29 A. (2d) 111 (1942); Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. (2d) 442
(1943), (1944) 22 N. C. L. REv. 160, (1945) 30 Iowa. L. REv. 232; iLcon and AnderZon,
Liabilify of Air Carriers (1942) 13 J. Am. L. & Coim. 281; cf. Towle v. Phillip:, 10 Tenn.
121, 172 S. XV. (2d) S06 (1943).
126. Goldin, TU Doctrie of Res Ipsa Loquitur in .4viaion L (1944) 18 So. CAur.
L. Rav. 15; cf. Nysted v. Wings, Ltd. (1942) 3 D. L. R. 336 (K. B. Manitoba).
127. Examples: Dittiger v. Isal Realty Corp., 290 N. Y. 492, 49 N. E. (2d) 980 (1943)
(falling ceiling); Geo. Foltis, Inc. v. New York, 287 N. Y. 103, 38 N. E. (2d) 455 (1941)
(break in vatermain); Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N. C. 616, 24 S. E. (2d) 477 (19.43),
21 N. C. L. Rav. 402 (unexplained leaving of road by auto, slddding, blowout, and punc-
ture being eliminated); Washington L. & T. Co. v. Hickey, 137 F. (2d) 677 (App. D. C.
1943) (ventilator falling from building).
128. PRossER, ToRTs (1941) 295.
129. See cases cited in note 124 supra. Other recent decisions involving a cimilar appli-
cation of this requirement are Washington L. & '. Co. v. Hickey, 137 F. (2d) 677 (App.
D. C. 1943); Nicldsch v. Madisoan-34th St. Corp., 185 Misc. 25, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 767
(City Ct. N. Y. 1944) aff'd 135 Misc. 10, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 770 (Ist Dep't 1945). In each of
these cases what was done wrong happened while defendant's employee vas cleaning
premises. The opinions in both cases are well reasoned.
130. Dunn v. Hoffman Bev. Co., 126 N. J. L. 556, 20 A. (2d) 352 (1941). Other cares
where the court held there was not sufficient control are Gibbs v. General Motors Corp.,
350 Mo. 431, 166 S. W. (2d) 575 (1942) (brake3 failed to work properly after plaintiff had
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But in some situations, something less than this logical requirement is
insisted on. Where plaintiff shows he was a passenger injured when his
common carrier collided with another, one line of cases gives him the
benefit of res ipsa loquitur against the carrier but not against the third
person though the result can scarcely be justified by the probabilities
of the situation and the control by each defendant is only partial. The
District of Columbia has recently adopted this rule by a decision which
reviews the divergent authorities.' But the outstanding decision on
the question of control is Ybarra v. Spangard.112 There plaintiff had an
appendectomy. After the operation it was found that he had received
a traumatic injury to his shoulder while under anesthetic. He sued
all the nurses and doctors (six of them) who attended the operatioif
and on the showing described, relied on res ipsa loquitur. The California
court stressed the new flexibility in the requirement of control, the
exceptional nature of the circumstances and the plaintiff's utter in-
ability to identify the wrongdoer, and put the burden of exculpation on
defendants. This decision shows real judicial statesmanship.
The procedural effect to be given to the doctrine when it applies has
been the subject of a recent New York decision which appears to adopt
the majority rule authoritatively for that state, and to end the uncer-
tainty which had existed there. Geo. Foltis v. New York "I states
car two months and had driven it 1,530 miles); Highland Golf Club v. Sinclair Refining Co.,
59 F. Supp. 911 (N. D. Iowa, 1945) (fire started when defendant's employee was delivering
gasoline to plaintiff); McBride v. Paluxy Asphalt Co., 164 S. W. (2d) 32 (Tex. Civ. App.
1942) (deceased loading truck with defendant's loading equipment when truck exploded);
Watkins v. TaylorFurnishing Co., 244 N. C. 674,31 S. E. (2d) 917 (944), (1945) 23 N. C. L.
Rnv. 376 (magic eye door); Mineo v. Rand's Food Shops, Inc., 32 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 23
(City Ct. N. Y. 1941) (restaurant stool); Easson v. London & N. E. R. R. [1944] K. B. 421
(opening of door in corridor train).
131. Capital Transit Co. v. Jackson, 149 F. (2d) 839 (App. D. C. 1945). A note to the
decision below appears in (1944) 33 GEO. L. J. 119.
132. 25 Cal. (2d) 486, 154 P. (2d) 687 (1944), (1945) 25 B. U. L. REV. 295; (1945) 33
CALn. L. REv. 331; (1945) 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 310.
133. 287 N. Y. 108, 38 N. E. (2d) 455 (1941), (1945) 17 ST. JOnN's L. REV. 117.
A rule resembling res ipsa loquitur is applied in cases where a bailor can show delivery
of the thing bailed in good condition, and failure to redeliver it, or redelivery in damaged
condition. He then makes out a prima facie case of negligence against his bailee and the
latter must come forward with explanations. But here, as in res ipsa loquitur, courts differ
as to the procedural effect of such a showing. Some courts hold that if the bailee simply
shows the goods were lost by fire or theft, he is entitled to a directed verdict unless the
bailor then proves negligence. Castorina v. Rosen, 290 N. Y. 445, 49 N. E. (2d) 521 (1943).
Others-probably a majority hold that defendant must go further and show that the
fire or theft occurred without negligence on defendant's part. Berkowitz v. Pierce, 129
N. J. L. 299, 29 A. (2d) 552 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Huie v. Lay, 170 S. W. (2d) 823 (Tex, Civ.
App. 1943) (bailor entitled to judgment n.o.v. where no explanation of fire was offered);
Zanker v. Cedar Flying Service, Inc., 214 Minn. 242, 7 N. W. (2d) 775 (1943) (Charge
putting risk of non-persuasion on defendant, upheld). An excellent treatment of recent
cases is found in a note (1944) 22 N. C. L. Rv. 252. Here the presumption or rule is grounded
frankly on policy and it clearly appears that the question of how much procedural effect
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that even in the absence of any evidence from defendant, plaintiff ,;ill
not be entitled to a directed verdict unless his prima facie proof is so
strong as to leave no room for a reasonable inference favorable to de-
fendant. But the facts which bring a case within the principle of res
ipsa loquitur afford an inference of negligence unless they are explained
away.
(d) Causation. As in the case of any other issue, proof of cause is often
circumstantial. Where it is, as we have seen, there is sometimes a great
deal of latitude in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence. This is
brought into rather bitter relief by the unsympathetic rejection of
inferences, in lIorrison v. Le Tourneav, which an able writer has show
to be well within the realm of the reasonable.134
This case also deals with a much vexed and it seems to me unneces-
sarily confused aspect of legal cause, the injury caused by the unli-
censed operator. Of course a licensing statute may be purely a revenue
measure and not meant at all to protect the safety of members of the
public. But many licensing statutes have as a purpose "the protection
of the general public against injury . . . [by] unskilled or unlearned
practitioners . . . [or operators, as the case may be]." 13- When a
man who is unlicensed causes injury in the course of doing something
for which such a license is required there can be little question that an
act prohibited by a safety statute has caused the injury. To some that
ends the matter."' But others have been troubled by the fear that the
defendant may in fact have been highly skilled, though unlicensed, or
that there may have been no connection at all between any possible
want of skill and the injury, so that the injury did not come about
through the evil the statute was aimed at. Because of these possibilities
some courts in effect deprive plaintiff of any benefit of the statute at
to give it is purely a matter of how much it is felt the policy requires the rule to accomplizb.
It is a matter of adjusting a judicial handicap. In res ipsa loquitur cases policy is blended
with and often obscured by consideration of real or supposed balances of probability. So
there are (at least) two variable factors which might effect the strength which will h at-
tached to a showing made under the rule. Sometimes the problem is overtimplifed by
losing sight of the very considerable policy factor.
An interesting variation of the rule as to bailments is suggested in Elliott v. N. Y. Rapid
Transit Corp., 293 N. Y. 145, 56 N. E. (2d) S6 (1944), where the court statea that a prima
fade case of negligence against a carrier is made out by showing its acceptance of a paszenger
in a very drunk but otherwise undamaged condition, and his death by falling from the ele-
xated trestle to the street before carrier custody was terminated.
134. 13S F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) criticized in Note, (1944) 3S Im. L. RIv 326.
135. Brown v. Shyne, 242 N. Y. 176, 180, 151 N. E. 197, 198 (1926).
136. This point of view is clearly spelled out in Johnson v. Boston and M. R. R., S3
N. H. 350, 143 AUt. 516 (1928). See also Lowndes, Civil Liability Crcatcd by Crinzinoa L's-
lation (1932) 16 MINN. L. R.v. 361, 373. A recent reflection of this point of vew is found
in Bushnell v. Telluride Power Co., 145 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 10th, 1944) (cetting fire vith-
out permit).
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all. 3 ' Both views seem extreme. The great surgeon from another
state who performs an operation while on his vacation in the Adiron-
dacks should not be held for malpractice merely for want of a New York
license. On the other hand it is more than reasonable to suppose that
the unlicensed, as a class, are deficient in the particular skill for which a
license is required. And it is certainly true that when the unskilled at-
tempt what it takes skill to do, some of the intangible factors that go
to make up lack of skill are far more likely than not to have contributed
to any mishap that occurs. Frequently they do this in ways that it is
hard to prove; moreover what evidence there is in the matter is likely
to be in the defendant's hands. Both probability and policy, therefore,
call for the rule that breach of a licensing statute, if it is negligence to
the plaintiff at all, should be prima facie evidence that it is the "proxi-
mate cause" of any injury that ensues.""
Many problems that are sometimes treated as matters of proximate
cause have been dealt with above under the head of duty where, as
Dean Green and others have shown, they more appropriately belong.130
Questions whether the intervening acts of third persons "break the
chain of causation' between defendant's wrong and plaintiff's injury,
are, for instance likely to be questions of the extent of defendant's
duty. 4 Nevertheless some courts continue to insist on discussing these
problems in terms of legal cause. Two recent decisions illustrate the
difficulties that result. In Neering v. Illinois Central Railroad,'4' the
court had to decide whether a railroad must take affirmative steps to
protect women passengers from assault in a lonely waiting room where
hoboes were known to congregate. The court found there was the duty
because of the relationship between the parties and the likelihood of
137. See Morrison v. Le Tourneau, 138 F. (2d) 339 (C. C. A. 5th, 1943) "There is argu-
ment that the possession of only a pilot's license is evidence, or the basis of a presumption,
that the possessor is lacking in skill as a pilot. This does not necessarily follow. He nay
not have chosen to take further examinations although he might have been abundantly
qualified for commercial or transport license for aught the record shows. . . .' Id. at 341
(Italics supplied). Why does the court insist in talking about possibilities which are patently
less than probable? See Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 27 S. E. (2d) 442 (1943). The
classic opinion is that in Brown v. Shyne, 242 N. Y. 176, 151 N. E. 197 (1926).
138. Compare Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N. E. 814 (1920) (fact that unlighted
vehicle was struck by another in the dark is evidence that the collision occurred because of
the lack of lights).
139. GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAusE (1927). The authorities are collected
and the matter is treated with excellent clarity in PROSSER, TORTS (1941) c. 8.
140. But sometimes the problem is one of whether to limit defendant's liability for a
breach of duty. A typical example is the problem of the injury negligently caused by defend-
ant but aggravated by a doctor's malpractice. Ash v. Mortensen, 24 Cal. (2d) 654, 150 P.
(2d) 876 (1944). The decision below, reversed on appeal, is noted in (1944) 17 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 328. Cf. also City of Port Arthur v. Wallace, 141 Tex. 201, 171 S. W. (2d) 480
(1943), (1944) 22 TEx. L. Pnv. 240; and the Pennsylvania rule referred to in note 91, supra.
141. 383 Ill. 366, 50 N. E. (2d) 497 (1943).
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harm. It then repeated exactly the same inquiry into lil:elihood to see
whether injury from such an assault was the proximate result of breach
of the duty. Since the conclusion in the two inquiries was identical, no
harm was caused except confusion. But in another derision the same
court shows that confusion can be a very serious harm. In M'erlo v.
Public Service Company,142 defendant's high tension wires over the
highway had been allowed to sag and become uninsulated. Deceased,
the employee of a contractor working on the highway, was electrocuted
when the boom of an excavator fouled the wire. Defendant was held
negligent because "men would likely be working in the streets
with modem machinery, such as was used in this instance . . .," 143
but this negligence wras not the legal cause of the death because "the
crane operator's negligence was [not] the natural and probable conse-
quence of the lack of insulation and the sagging wires." "I These deci-
sions are the subject of able critical comment by Dean Green.'
Impediments to Recovery Becautse of Plaintifs Own Conduct or
Relationships
As long as fault is the guiding principle in accident law, the most
satisfactory way to treat plaintiff's contributory fault is by applying
the principle of comparative negligence. Juries probably do just about
this when cases get to them, in spite of the instructions,' and the
office of a comparative negligence statute should be fully as much to
assure that cases get to the jury as to permit language of comparative
negligence to find its way into the charge. For that reason it is disap-
pointing indeed to find that one of the few states to have a comparative
negligence statute still rules a plaintiff out of court as a matter of law,-
in just about the same situations as it did before the statute.147
142. 381 Ill. 300, 45 N. E. (2d) 665 (1942). Contrast Bosjnak v. Supzrior Sheet Steel
Co., 145 Ohio St. 533, 62 N. E. (2d) 305 (1945).
143. Merlo v. Public Service Co., 3S1 Ill. 300,315, 45 N. E. (2d) 665, 674 (1942).
144. Id. at 313, 45 N. E. (2d) at 675.
145. Green, Illinois Aegligence Law IV (1945) 40 ILL. L. RPv. 1, 11, 12, 28; Green,
Merlo v. Public Serice Co.-A study in Proximate Cause (1943) 37 ILL. L. RPv. 429.
146. See Malone, Contributory Negligece and tire Landowner Cases (1945) 29 Mlnm. L.
REv. 61, 62--66; James, Last Ckar Chance: A Transitional Doctrine (1938) 47 YXAs L. J.
704, 721.
147. Peters v. Chicago Al. St. P. & P. R. R., 230 Wis. 299, 2S3 N. W. .03 (1939); Geyer
v. Milwaukee E. R. & L. Ry., 230 Wis. 347, 284 N. N. 1 (1939); Patterson v. Chicago,
St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 236 Wis. 205, 294 N. IN. 63 (1940). Under the statute plaintiff may
recover only if his negligence "was not as great as the negligence" of the defendant. Wis.
STAT. (1943) § 331. 045. The technique of these cases is to hold that as matter of law pain-
tiff's negligence was at least equal to defendant's. Apparently, however, in cases where
there would not formerly have been a directed verdict on the issue, the court is reluctant
to formulate rules of thumb as to when faults are equal, and this is commendable. Campa-
nelli v. Mlilwaukee Electric Railway and Transport Co., 242 Wis. 505, 8 N. Il. (2d) 390
(1943). 27 MARQ. L. Rnv. 219.
1946]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
In states which have no such statute, modifications of contributory
negligence have come through rules which eliminate it as a defense
entirely in certain types of situations.'48 One such development has
recently taken place in Connecticut. It is now established in that
state that contributory negligence is no defense to an action for a
nuisance where the very condition which constitutes the nuisance was
created intentionally (though with no intent to cause injury). 149 Such
a nuisance is called "absolute." Thus where a driveway was con-
structed so as to cause a depression in the sidewalk dangerous to trav-
elers, 5 ' where a cable was stretched across a highway, 161 or where a
diving board was installed in a public park over a pond whose shallow-
ness was dangerously concealed, 5 2 there was a nuisance to which con-
tributory negligence was no defense. But not all nuisances are "abso-
lute." They are not if the danger arises from the negligent manner in
which the intended conditions are created or maintained, instead of
from those conditions themselves.1 3 And to nuisances thus grounded
on negligence, contributory negligence is a defense. So far as I know
this rule is unique. The grandfather of all contributory negligence
cases '54 represented precisely the situation wherein the Connecticut
court now expressly says that contributory negligence is unavailable,
namely, an obstruction placed in the highway. This development has
the merit of cutting down the defense of contributory negligence. But
if that should not be regarded as a merit, the rule might be a little hard
to justify.
148. An interesting development, which has taken place largely before the war, concerns
the defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of risk in automobile guest cases.
See Rice, The Automobile Guest and the Rationale of Assumption of Risk (1943) 27 MINN. L.
REV. 323, 429; Campbell, Host-Guest Rules in Wisconsin (1943) Wis. L. REV. 180; Note
(1943) 29 IowA L. Rv. 115. Under some guest statutes at least contributory negligence is
no longer a defense; but assumption of risk is. Garrity v. Mangan, 232 Iowa 1188, 6 N. W.
(2d) 292 (1942) (plaintiff who rides with driver known to be drunk assumes risk). See also
Malone, Contributory Negligence and the Landowner Cases (1945) 29 MINN. L. Rav. 61.
149. Beckwith v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A. (2d) 775 (1942).
150. Ibid.
151. Hill v. Way, 117 Conn. 359, 168 Atl. 1 (1933). Actually a different view was taken
in that case. But to the extent that it was, the decision was expressly overruled by Beck-
with v. Town of Stratford, 129 Conn. 506, 29 A. (2d) 775 (1942), cited supra note 147.
152. Hoffman v. City of Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 Atl. 499 (1931).
153. This is all explained in the opinion in Beckwith v. Town of Stratford 129 Conn.
506, 29 A. (2d) 775 (1942). The street sweeper proceeding against traffic with insufficient
lights on a dark night, was given as an example of a nuisance which is not absolute. See
Warren v. City of Bridgeport, 129 Conn. 355, 28 A. (2d) 1 (1942).
154. Butterfield v. Forrester, 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. R. 926 (K. B. 1809); Bohlen,
Contributory Negligence (1908) 21 HARv. L. REv. 233. The leading modern case is McFar-
lane v. Niagara Falls, 247 N. Y. 340, 160 N. E. 391 (1928). There the defect in the sidewalk
was due to a flaw in its construction and the Connecticut court distinguishes it on that
ground. But there is nothing in the McFarlane decision to suggest that the New York court
would draw any such distinction. On the contrary it cites with apparent approval Butter-
field v. Forrester, supra.
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Though the elimination of contributory negligence as a defense to
actions based on wilful or wanton misconduct had become quite gen-
eral, a recent Pennsylvania case adopts the rule for the first time in that
state.15 Because of the way Pennsylvania has extended the concepts of
what is wilful or wanton in cases involving injuries to trespassers, it is a
little uncertain just what the consequences of this step will be, par-
ticularly in the field of last clear chance (a hitherto forbidden pasture in
Pennsylvania). 15
The bar of contributory negligence is often avoided by involdng the
doctrine of the last clear chance. Here, too, there have been notable
developments. In CUwsapeake & Ohio Railway v. Pope,1' a mail carrier
with his bag on his back negligently tried to cross in front of an ap-
proaching train. In spite of his carelessness he would have reached
safety had not his foot caught in a depression on the crossing which
defendant was bound to keep in repair. The train crew had no rea-
sonable opportunity to avoid running over him. He was allowed
to recover, nevertheless, on the ground that the defect in the crossing
was the sole proximate cause of his injury. This distortion of reasoning
brings about a result like that in the famous Loaclz Is case which may
perhaps be gaining ground in rAmerica." 9 There, it will be recalled,
the defendant railroad company was held liable, despite contributory
negligence, because the trolley car's defective brakes were not, but
should have been, able to stop it in time to avoid a collision.
There may well be here another case where demonstrable fallacy
in logic is more than compensated by avoiding the harsh conclusion
which would otherwise be required by deductive reasoning, when the
outworn premises do not meet the needs or reflect the sentiments of
today. The trouble with the process described is that it may be capri-
cious and rudderless if it is not accompanied by a careful thinking
through of the premises that today's conditions demand; and unfortu-
nately the very nature of the process tends to conceal rather than
highlight this real problemcQ Yet it is the way the law often moves
155. Kasanovich v. George, 348 Pa. 199,34 A. (2d) S23 (1943).
156. The background of the case in former Pennsylvania law is well dercribed in a note,
Tlwse "W1'easel Wfords-"Wiilfzd and ranton" (1944) 92 U. or PA. L. Rv. 431. One com-
mentator voices the caution that "What the Pennsylvania courts must do is avoid the ap.
plication of the discovered peril doctrine under the guise of tallng the language of wanton
misconduct." Note (1944) 48 Dici. L. REv. 197, 200, n. 9. It is hard to see why that would
be such a misfortune.
157. 296 Ky. 254, 176 S. W. (2d) 876 (1943), (1945) 33 Ky. L. J. 132 (pointing out that
Kentucky had theretofore rejected the principle in the Loach case).
158. British Columbia Electric Ry. v. Loach, [P. C. 1916] 1 A. C. 719.
159. PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 415. Most of the previous American casea have had to do
with defendant's antecedent failure to provide the means for effective look out (e.g., proplr
headlight). During the w.ar another jurisdiction has adopted this branch of the Leach rule.
Krause v. Pitcairn and Nicodemus, 350 Mo. 339, 167 S. X1. (2d) 74 (1942).
160. PROSSER, TORTS (1941) § 54, particularly pp. 410, 416; James, Last Clear CTare:
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and no one can intelligently appraise or forecast the judicial process
without realizing it.
Another case in which a progressive result is reached through logic's
back door is Gregory v. Maine Central Railroad.' Here the Massachu-
setts court put on the defendant the burden of disproving last clear
chance. The burden of proving contributory negligence, it reasoned,
was on defendant. Defendant, therefore, must show that plaintiff's
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. But plaintiff's negli-
gence was not such a proximate cause if defendant had a last clear
chance. Therefore defendant must negative this last clear chance in
order to show the causal relation between plaintiff's negligence and his
injury, necessary to render such negligence "contributory." The major-
ity rule, with unerring accuracy, points out that in all these cases
plaintiff's negligence is a proximate cause of his injury (else there
would be no need to invoke last clear chance), and that last clear
chance is analytically a matter of avoiding a defense." 2 What this
rule overlooks is that the whole structure of last clear chahce is a logical
anomaly anyhow; that its real function is not to serve a syllogism but
to lessen the harshness of the rule under which any contributory negli-
gence keeps a plaintiff from all recovery; and that this function is better
served by the Massachusetts rule although that does involve using the
phrase "proximate cause" in a special Pickwickian sense for which
after all there is plenty of respectable authority.
There has generally been a marked tendency in last clear chance
cases to hold more strictly accountable the person who sees the trouble
brewing, than the person who is negligently unaware of danger.'
This is sound comparative negligence (though again the result distorts
the logic actually used), and it has led to a sensible decision in a recent
Missouri case. 64 Defendant's freight train blocked a crossing at night.
A brakeman saw an approaching truck and realized it was not slowing
up. Defendant was held for the brakeman's failure to shout a warning.
The humanitarian rule here is used to narrow the unfortunate gap
between law and morals as in the "good Samaritan" cases, though it is
A Transitional Doctrine (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 704. Cf. Norwegian Shipping & Trade Mission
v. Behenna, (1943) 76 Li. L. R. 91, which, if it is accurately described in Note (1944) 60
L. Q. REv. 15, applies to the Loach case principle in reverse to defeat recovery.
161. 317 Mass. 636, 59 N. E. (2d) 471 (1945), 25 B. U. L. Ruv. 147.
162. Russell v. Kelly, 180 Va. 304, 23 S. E. (2d) 124 (1942); Clark v. Boston & Maine
R. R. 87 N. H. 434, 182 At). 175 (1935); Redmon v. Southern Ry., 195 N. C. 764, 143 S. E.
829 (1928).
163. James, supra note 158, at 712-4.
164. Zickefoose v. Thompson, 347 Mo. 579, 148 S. W. (2d) 784 (1941), rehearing denied,
237 Mo. App. 690, 157 S. W. (2d) 259 (1941), (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 185. On the whole,
however, a conservative trend has been noted in recent Missouri decisions on the humani-
tarian rule. Note (1941) 6 Mo. L. REv. 230. Cf. also Becker, The Humanitarian Rule
(1943) 8 Mo. L. REv. 261; Note (1942) 7 Mo. L. REv. 320.
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plain to be seen that the brakeman's chance was no later than the
truck driver's. 65
The q est of a financially responsible defendazt.
It was once the lav's prevailing attitude that it had no obligation to
provide plaintiff with a financially responsible defendant. But with a
wider recognition of the serious social problem created by the uncom-
pensated accident victim, it has become the increasing concern of so-
ciety not only to extend the substantive rules of liability, but also to
give ever greater assurance that theoretical liability will be satisfied.c5
The state of Massachusetts, and several foreign countries, have taken
the thoroughgoing step of making liability insurance compulsory in the
critical motor vehicle field. During the war, the decrease in automobile
traffic and the preoccupation with other matters brought a lull in the
pressure for this sort of thing although a few states tightened up their
financial responsibility laws.'1
The courts, too, have played a part in this process by extending
principles of vicarious liability (notably by the family car doctrine).1cJ
But in a good part of the automobile field the importance of these judi-
cial doctrines has been overshadowed by statutes imposing even wider
165. Compare note 100 suv'ra.
166. COLJMIBL. UivERsrry RnsrPnc CoUNci., REroRT By Co,_nmu= To SUnY
COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT (1932); Bo.s, Co AuLsony AuToxo=nuz
INsURAxcE (1929); PROBLEnS RELATING TO BILL OF RIGHTs ,LND Gr_-.AL W.LrAni=
(1938) New York State Constitutional Convention Committee, c. c; Corstvet, T7:c Ur-
rompensat d Accident a-d-.s Conscquenes (1936) 3 LAW a Co.=EnrIP. Pnob. 466.
167. Auto Aaidents- zat S7a1 We Do About T:em? (1942) 27 Mimi. L. RZv. 103,
shows that the Minnesota State Bar Association proposed a compulsory insurance act for
that state. A Comment (1943) 22 MIica. ST. BAR J. 3S7, indicates some of the e:ipriente
under the New York amendment. N. Y., Laws 1941, c. 872. The Michigan amendment was
adopted in 1943, Mich. Acts 1943, Act 203, § 3A.
168. Although there has been a tendency to extend the vicarious liability of certain
classes of defendants, there has been almost as pronounced a shift away from doctrines
which would impute another's negligence to a plaintiff. See generally SauLM"= AND Jums,
CASES AND MATEALS ON TORTS (1942) 6S1 ef. scq. Illustrative recent cases are He zler v.
Nelipowitz, 55 N. Y. S. (2d) 692 (Mun. Ct. Syracuse, 1945) (although owner of auto liable
under statute to third persons injured by negligence of bailee, yet such negligence vi not
be imputed to owner in suit for damage caused to auto by third person's negligence); Turenne
v. Smith, 215 Minn. 64, 9 N. I. (2d) 409 (1943), 27 MIxm. L. Rnv. 579 (relation-hip of
principal and agent does not confer immunity in suits between them. Case alko holds that
immunity which principal would enjoy from suit by son, does not enure to agent). A recent
North Carolina decision, however, seems to assume that an agent enjoys immunity from
suits by the principal for injuries caused him by the agent's negligence. Harpzr v. Harp-r,
225 N. C. 260, 34 S. E. (2d) 185 (1945).
Apparently the fear of having a driver's negligence imputed to the guLst in a paZ:ible
suit by or against a third person caused the Washington court recently to restrict the rule
of joint venture so that it no longer applies where e-xpenses are to be shared by persons on a
trip for non-business purposes. Poutre v. Saunders, 19 Wash. (2d) 561, 143 P. (2d) 554
(1943).
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vicarious liability or by extended coverage clauses voluntarily written
into liability policies by insurance companies.' 9 These have pushed
the frontiers of litigation beyond "scope of employment" to the con-
struction of such words as "consent" contained in statutes or poli-
cies.' Several recent decisions indicate a liberal attitude towards
such problems.'
CONCLUSION
In spite of general preoccupation with other matters and notwith-
standing such factors as the decreased civilian use of automobiles, the
war years produced their share of significant judicial decisions dealing
with the adjustment of the losses which are the accidental by-product
of mechanical progress. Where these decisions make a change, they
generally do so along paths which had started to become well marked
before the war. The system of liability based on fault is being modified
by the courts so as constantly to extend the bases of recovery for acci-
dent victims. Judicial modification is likely to continue along the same
lines and at about the same pace.
During the war there has, however, been virtually no important
legislative modification in this field of tort law. The future here is
harder to predict. Although Workmen's Compensation statutes were
among the first major steps which this country took in the direction of
social insurance, yet the great movement during the depression towards
increased social security saw no really significant statutory advance in
assuring compensation for accidents beyond the Massachusetts com-
pulsory insurance law. This fact may have been due in part to the
greater ability and willingness of the courts to make so many more of
the needed changes in this field than in providing for the vicissitudes
of illness, old age, unemployment and the like. At any rate it makes
unsafe any forecast that the pace of legislative change in adjusting the
losses from accident will be greatly quickened in the foreseeable future,
though the direction and end of future legislative change seem clear
enough.
169. See PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 500.
170. See SHULMAN AND JAMES, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (1942) 669-697;
PROSSER, TORTS (1941) 503.
171. Souza v. Corti, 22 Cal. (2d) 454, 139 P. (2d) 645 (1943), 31 CALIF. L. REV. 572,
(1944) 17 So. CALIF. L. REV. 326 (owner liable even where son lends car to forbidden per-
son); Krum v. Malloy, 22 Cal. (2d) 132, 137 P. (2d) 18 (1943), (1944) 28 MINN. L. REv. 282
(co-ownership of auto affords inference of consent by one co-owner to use by other); Ridley
v. Young, 64 Cal. App. (2d) 503, 149 P. (2d) 76 (1944), 18 So. CALIF. L. REV. 75 (minor
held as consenting owner even though minor cannot validly give authority to agent);
Gutknecht v. Johnson, 62 Cal. App. (2d) 315,' 144 P. (2d) 854 (1944), 17 So. CALIF. L. REV.
414 (conditional vendor who had not given the required statutory "immediate" notice of
transfer to department of motor vehicles, held as consenting owner).
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